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For the Danish king, see Harald Bluetooth.

Short distance wireless technology standard

Bluetooth is a short-range wireless technology standard that is used for exchanging data between fixed and mobile devices over short distances using UHFradio waves in the ISM bands, from GHz to &#;GHz, and building personal area networks (PANs).[4] It was originally conceived as a wireless alternative to RS data cables. It is mainly used as an alternative to wire connections, to exchange files between nearby portable devices and connect cell phones and music players with wireless headphones. In the most widely used mode, transmission power is limited to milliwatts, Project Risk Analysis v1.0 by CORE crack serial keygen, giving it a very short range of up to 10&#;meters (30&#;feet).

Bluetooth is managed by the Bluetooth Special Interest Group (SIG), which has more than 35, member companies in the areas of telecommunication, computing, networking, and consumer electronics. The IEEE standardized Bluetooth as IEEE , but no longer maintains the standard. The Bluetooth SIG oversees development of the specification, manages the qualification program, and protects the trademarks.[5] A manufacturer must meet Bluetooth SIG standards to market it as a Bluetooth device.[6] A network of patents apply to the technology, which are licensed to individual qualifying devices. As of [update], Bluetooth integrated circuit chips ship approximately &#;million units annually.[7] Bythere were billion Bluetooth devices shipping annually and the shipments were expected to continue increasing at about 12% a year.[8]


The name “Bluetooth” was proposed in by Jim Kardach of Intel, one of the founders of the Bluetooth SIG. The name was inspired by a conversation with Sven Mattisson who related Scandinavian history through tales from Frans G. Bengtsson's The Long Ships, a historical novel about Vikings and the 10th-century Danish king Harald Bluetooth. Upon discovering a picture of the Harald Bluetooth rune stone[9] in the book Gwyn Jones's A History of the Vikings, Jim proposed Bluetooth as the codename for the short-range wireless program which is now called Bluetooth.[10][11][12]

Kardach was later quoted as saying, “King Harald Bluetooth…was famous for uniting Scandinavia just as we intended to unite the PC and cellular industries with a short-range wireless link.” Bluetooth was only intended as a placeholder until marketing could come up with something really cool.[13]

Bluetooth is the Anglicised version of the Scandinavian Blåtand/Blåtann (or in Old Norseblátǫnn). It was the epithet of King Harald Bluetooth, who united the disparate Danish tribes into a single kingdom; Kardach chose the name to imply that Bluetooth similarly unites communication protocols.[14]


The Bluetooth logo Bluetooth FM is a bind rune merging the Younger FutharkrunesRunic letter;(ᚼ, Hagall) and Runic letter;(ᛒ, Bjarkan), Harald's initials.[15][16]


The development of the "short-link" radio technology, later named Bluetooth, was initiated in by Nils Rydbeck, CTO at Ericsson Mobile in Lund, Sweden. The purpose was to develop wireless headsets, according to two inventions by Johan Ullman, SE , issued &#; and SE , issued &#. Nils Rydbeck tasked Tord Wingren with specifying and Dutchman Jaap Haartsen and Sven Mattisson with developing.[17] Both were working for Ericsson in Lund.[18] Principal design and development began in and by the team had a workable solution.[19] From Örjan Johansson became the project leader and propelled the technology and standardization.[20][21][22][23]

InAdalio Sanchez, then head of IBMThinkPad product R&D, approached Nils Rydbeck about collaborating on integrating a mobile phone into a ThinkPad notebook. The two assigned engineers from Ericsson and IBM to study the idea. The conclusion was that power consumption on cellphone technology at that time was too high to allow viable integration into a notebook and still achieve adequate battery life. Instead, the two companies agreed to integrate Ericsson's short-link technology on both a ThinkPad notebook and an Ericsson phone to accomplish the goal. Since neither IBM ThinkPad notebooks nor Ericsson phones were the market share leaders in their respective markets at that time, Adalio Sanchez and Nils Rydbeck agreed to make the short-link technology an open industry standard to permit each player maximum market access. Ericsson contributed the short-link radio technology, and IBM contributed patents around the logical layer. Adalio Sanchez of IBM then recruited Stephen Nachtsheim of Intel to join and then Intel also recruited Toshiba and Nokia. In Maythe Bluetooth SIG was launched with IBM and Ericsson as the founding signatories and a total of five members: Ericsson, Intel, Nokia, Toshiba and IBM.

The first consumer Bluetooth device was launched in It was a hands-free mobile headset that earned the "Best of show Technology Award" at COMDEX. The first Bluetooth mobile phone was the Ericsson T36 but it was the revised T39 model that actually made it to store shelves in In parallel, IBM introduced the IBM ThinkPad A30 in October which was the first notebook with integrated Bluetooth.

Bluetooth's early incorporation into consumer electronics products continued at Vosi Technologies in Costa Mesa, Project Risk Analysis v1.0 by CORE crack serial keygen, California, USA, initially overseen by Microsoft Toolkit Activator Key Full Version members Bejan Amini and Tom Davidson. Vosi Technologies had been created by real estate developer Ivano Stegmenga, with United States Patentfor communication between a cellular phone and a vehicle's audio system. At the time, Sony/Ericsson had only a minor market share in the cellular phone market, which was dominated in the US by Nokia and Motorola. Due to ongoing negotiations for an intended licensing agreement with Motorola beginning in the late s, Vosi could not publicly disclose the intention, integration and initial development of other enabled devices which were to be the first “Smart Home” internet connected devices.

Vosi needed a means for the system to communicate without a wired connection from the vehicle to the other devices in the network. Bluetooth was chosen, since WiFi was not yet readily available or supported in the public market. Vosi had begun to develop the Vosi Cello integrated vehicular system and some other internet connected devices, one of which was intended to be a table-top device named the Vosi Symphony, networked with Bluetooth. Through the negotiations with Motorola, Vosi introduced and disclosed its intent to integrate Bluetooth in its devices. In the early s a legal battle ensued between Vosi and Motorola, which indefinitely suspended release of the devices. Later, Motorola implemented it in their devices which initiated the significant propagation of Bluetooth in the public market due to its large market share at the time.

InJaap Haartsen was nominated by the European Patent Office for the European Inventor Award.[19]


Bluetooth operates at frequencies between and &#;GHz, or and &#;GHz including guard bands 2&#;MHz wide at the bottom end and &#;MHz wide at the top.[24] This is in the globally unlicensed (but not unregulated) industrial, scientific and medical (ISM) &#;GHz short-range radio frequency band. Bluetooth uses a radio technology called frequency-hopping spread spectrum. Bluetooth divides transmitted data into packets, and transmits each packet on one of 79 designated Bluetooth channels. Each channel has a bandwidth of 1&#;MHz. It usually performs &#;hops per second, with adaptive frequency-hopping (AFH) enabled.[24]Bluetooth Low Energy uses 2&#;MHz spacing, which accommodates 40 channels.[25]

Originally, Gaussian frequency-shift keying (GFSK) modulation was the only modulation scheme available, Project Risk Analysis v1.0 by CORE crack serial keygen. Since the introduction of Bluetooth +EDR, π/4-DQPSK (differential quadrature phase-shift keying) and 8-DPSK modulation may also be used between compatible devices. Devices functioning with GFSK are said to be operating in basic rate (BR) mode, where an instantaneous bit rate of 1&#;Mbit/s is possible. The term Enhanced Data Rate (EDR) is used to describe π/4-DPSK (EDR2) and 8-DPSK (EDR3) schemes, each giving 2 and 3&#;Mbit/s respectively, Project Risk Analysis v1.0 by CORE crack serial keygen. The combination of these (BR and EDR) modes in Bluetooth radio technology is classified as a BR/EDR radio.

InApple published an extension called HDR which supports data rates of 4 (HDR4) and 8 (HDR8) Mbit/s using π/4-DQPSK modulation on 4MHz channels with forward error correction (FEC) [1].

Bluetooth is a packet-based protocol with a master/slave architecture. One master may communicate with up to seven slaves in a piconet. All devices within a given piconet use the clock provided by the master as the base for packet exchange, Project Risk Analysis v1.0 by CORE crack serial keygen. The master clock ticks with a period of &#;μs, two clock ticks then make up a slot of &#;µs, and two slots make up a slot pair of &#;µs. In the simple case of single-slot packets, the master transmits in even slots and receives in odd slots. The slave, conversely, receives in even slots and transmits in odd slots. Packets may be 1, 3, or 5 slots long, but in all cases, the master's transmission begins in even slots and the slave's in odd slots.

The above excludes Bluetooth Low Energy, SolidWorks 2021 Crack Incl Serial Number Free [Latest] in the specification, which uses the same spectrum but somewhat differently.

Communication and connection[edit]

A master BR/EDR Bluetooth device can communicate with a maximum of seven devices in a piconet (an ad hoc computer network using Bluetooth technology), though not all devices reach this maximum. The devices can switch roles, by agreement, and the slave can become the master (for example, a headset initiating a connection to a phone necessarily begins as master—as an initiator of the connection—but may subsequently operate as the slave).

The Bluetooth Core Specification provides for the connection of two or more piconets to form a scatternet, in which certain devices simultaneously play the master role in one piconet and the slave role in another.

At any given time, data can be transferred between the master and one other device (except for the little-used broadcast mode). The master chooses which slave device to address; typically, it switches rapidly from one device to another in a round-robin fashion. Since it is the master that chooses which slave to address, whereas a slave is (in theory) supposed to listen in each receive slot, being a master is a lighter burden than being a slave. Being a master of seven slaves is possible; being a slave of more than one master is possible. The specification is vague as to required behavior in scatternets.[26]


Class Max. permitted power Typ. range
(mW) (dBm)
1 20~
2 4~10
3 10~1
4 −3~
Source:BT 5 Vol 6 Part A Sect 3,Bluetooth Simplify3d serial key Archives Website

Bluetooth is a standard wire-replacement communications protocol primarily designed for low power consumption, with a short range based on low-cost transceivermicrochips in each device.[27] Because the devices use a radio (broadcast) communications system, they do not have to be in visual line of sight of each other; however, a quasi optical wireless path must be viable.[28] Range is power-class-dependent, but effective ranges vary in practice. See the table "Ranges of Bluetooth devices by class".

Officially Class 3 radios have a range of up to 1 metre (3&#;ft), Class 2, most commonly found in mobile devices, 10 metres (33&#;ft), and Class 1, primarily for industrial use cases, metres (&#;ft).[2] Bluetooth Marketing qualifies that Class 1 range is in most cases 20–30 metres (66–98&#;ft), and Class 2 range 5–10 metres (16–33&#;ft).[1] The actual range achieved by a given link will depend on the qualities of the devices at both ends of the link, as well as the air conditions in between, and other factors.

The effective range varies depending on propagation conditions, material coverage, production sample variations, antenna configurations and battery conditions. Most Bluetooth applications are for indoor conditions, where attenuation of walls and signal fading due to signal reflections make the range far lower than specified line-of-sight ranges of the Bluetooth products.

Most Bluetooth applications are battery-powered Class&#;2 devices, with little difference in range whether the other end Project Risk Analysis v1.0 by CORE crack serial keygen the link is a Class&#;1 or Class&#;2 device as the lower-powered device tends to set the range limit, Project Risk Analysis v1.0 by CORE crack serial keygen. In some cases the effective range of the data link can be extended when a Class&#;2 device is connecting to a Class&#;1 transceiver with both higher sensitivity and transmission power than a typical Class&#;2 device.[29] Mostly, however, Project Risk Analysis v1.0 by CORE crack serial keygen, the Class&#;1 devices have a similar sensitivity to Class&#;2 devices. Connecting two Class&#;1 devices with both high sensitivity and high power can allow ranges far in excess of the typical m, depending on the throughput required by the application. Some such devices allow open field ranges of up to 1&#;km and beyond between two similar devices without exceeding legal emission limits.[30][31][32]

The Bluetooth Core Specification mandates a range of not less than 10 metres (33&#;ft), but there is no upper limit on actual range. Manufacturers' implementations can be tuned to provide the range needed for each case.[2]

Bluetooth profile[edit]

Main article: List of Bluetooth profiles

To use Bluetooth wireless technology, a device must be able to interpret certain Bluetooth profiles, which are definitions of possible applications and specify general behaviors that Bluetooth-enabled devices use to communicate with other Bluetooth devices. These profiles include settings to parameterize and to control the communication from the start. Adherence to profiles saves the time for transmitting the parameters anew before the bi-directional link becomes effective. There are a wide range of Bluetooth profiles that describe many different types of applications or use cases for devices.[33]

List of applications[edit]

A typical Bluetooth mobile phone headset
  • Wireless control and communication between a mobile phone and a handsfreeheadset. This was one of the earliest applications to become popular.[34]
  • Wireless control of and communication between a mobile phone and a Bluetooth compatible car stereo system (and sometimes between the SIM card and the car phone[35][36]).
  • Wireless communication between a smartphone and a smart lock for unlocking doors.
  • Wireless control of and communication with iOS and Android device phones, tablets and portable wireless speakers.[37]
  • Wireless Bluetooth headset and Intercom. Idiomatically, a headset is sometimes called "a Bluetooth".
  • Wireless streaming of audio to headphones with or without communication capabilities.
  • Wireless streaming of data collected by Bluetooth-enabled fitness devices to phone or PC.[38]
  • Wireless networking between PCs in a confined space and where little bandwidth is required.[39]
  • Wireless communication with PC input and output devices, the most common being the mouse, keyboard and printer.
  • Transfer of files, contact details, calendar appointments, and reminders between devices with OBEX[a] and sharing directories via FTP.[40]
  • Replacement of previous wired RS serial communications in test equipment, GPS receivers, medical equipment, bar code scanners, and traffic control devices.
  • For controls where infrared was often used.
  • For low bandwidth applications where higher USB bandwidth is not required and cable-free connection desired.
  • Sending small advertisements from Bluetooth-enabled advertising hoardings to other, discoverable, Bluetooth devices.[41]
  • Wireless bridge between two Industrial Ethernet (e.g., PROFINET) networks.
  • Seventh and eighth generationgame consoles such as Nintendo's Wii,[42] and Sony's PlayStation 3 use Bluetooth for their respective wireless controllers.
  • Dial-up internet access on personal computers or PDAs using a data-capable mobile phone as a wireless modem.
  • Short-range transmission of health sensor data from medical devices to mobile phone, set-top box or dedicated telehealth devices.[43][44]
  • Allowing a DECT phone to ring and answer calls on behalf of a nearby mobile phone.
  • Real-time location systems (RTLS) are used to track and identify the location of objects in real time using "Nodes" or "tags" attached to, or embedded in, the objects tracked, and "Readers" that receive and process the wireless signals from these tags to determine their locations.[45]
  • Personal security application on mobile phones for prevention of theft or loss of items. The protected item has a Bluetooth marker (e.g., a tag) that is in constant communication with the phone. If the connection is broken (the marker is out of range of the phone) then an alarm is raised. This can also be used as a man overboard alarm. A product using this technology has been available since [46]
  • Calgary, Alberta, Canada's Roads Traffic division uses data collected from travelers' Bluetooth devices to predict travel times and road congestion for motorists.[47]
  • Wireless transmission of audio (a more reliable alternative to FM transmitters)
  • Live video streaming to the visual cortical implant device by Nabeel Fattah in Newcastle university [48]
  • Connection of motion controllers to a PC when using VR headsets

Bluetooth vs Wi-Fi (IEEE )[edit]

Bluetooth and Wi-Fi (Wi-Fi is the brand name for products using IEEE standards) have some similar applications: setting up networks, printing, or transferring files. Wi-Fi is intended as a replacement for high-speed cabling for general local area network access in work areas or home. This category of applications is sometimes called wireless local area networks (WLAN). Bluetooth was intended for portable equipment and its applications. The category of applications is outlined as the wireless personal area network (WPAN). Bluetooth is a replacement for cabling in various personally carried applications in any setting and also works for fixed Project Risk Analysis v1.0 by CORE crack serial keygen applications such as smart energy functionality in the home (thermostats, etc.).

Wi-Fi and Bluetooth are to some extent complementary in their applications and usage. Wi-Fi is usually access point-centered, with an asymmetrical client-server connection with all traffic routed through the access point, while Bluetooth is usually symmetrical, between two Bluetooth devices. Bluetooth serves well in simple applications where two devices need to connect with a minimal configuration like a button press, as in headsets and speakers.


A Bluetooth USBdongle with a &#;m range

Bluetooth exists in numerous products such as telephones, speakers, tablets, media players, Project Risk Analysis v1.0 by CORE crack serial keygen, robotics systems, laptops, and console gaming equipment as well as some high definition headsets, modems, hearing aids[49] and even watches.[50] Given the variety of devices which use the Bluetooth, coupled with the contemporary deprecation of headphone jacks by Apple, Google, and other companies, and the lack of regulation by the FCC, the technology is prone to interference.[51] Nonetheless Bluetooth is useful when transferring information between two or more devices that are near each other in low-bandwidth situations, Project Risk Analysis v1.0 by CORE crack serial keygen. Bluetooth is commonly used to transfer sound data with telephones (i.e., with a Bluetooth headset) or byte data with hand-held computers (transferring files), Project Risk Analysis v1.0 by CORE crack serial keygen.

Bluetooth protocols simplify the discovery and setup of services between devices.[52] Bluetooth devices can advertise all of the services they provide.[53] This makes using services easier, because more of the security, network address and permission configuration can be automated than with many other network types.[52]

Computer requirements[edit]

A typical Bluetooth USBdongle
An internal notebook Bluetooth card (14×36×4&#;mm)

A personal computer that does not have embedded Bluetooth can use a Bluetooth adapter that enables the PC to communicate with Bluetooth devices. While some desktop computers and most recent laptops come with a built-in Bluetooth radio, others require an external adapter, typically in the form of a small USB "dongle."

Unlike its predecessor, IrDA, which requires a separate adapter for each device, Bluetooth lets multiple devices communicate with a computer over a single adapter.[54]

Operating system implementation[edit]

Further information: Bluetooth stack

For Microsoft platforms, Windows XP Service Pack 2 and SP3 releases work natively with Bluetooth v, v and v+EDR.[55] Previous versions required users to install their Bluetooth adapter's own drivers, which were not directly supported by Microsoft.[56] Microsoft's own Bluetooth dongles (packaged with their Bluetooth computer devices) have no external drivers and thus require at least Windows XP Service Pack 2. Windows Vista RTM/SP1 with the Feature Pack for Wireless or Windows Vista SP2 work with Bluetooth v+EDR.[55] Windows 7 works with Bluetooth v+EDR and Extended Inquiry Response (EIR).[55] The Windows XP and Windows Vista/Windows 7 Bluetooth stacks support the following Bluetooth profiles natively: PAN, SPP, DUN, HID, HCRP. The Windows XP stack can be replaced by a third party stack that supports more profiles or newer Bluetooth versions. The Windows Vista/Windows 7 Bluetooth stack supports vendor-supplied additional profiles without requiring that the Microsoft stack be replaced.[55] It is generally recommended to install the latest vendor driver and its associated stack to be able to use the Bluetooth device at its fullest extent.

Apple products have worked with Bluetooth since Mac OS&#;X&#;v, which was released in [57]

Linux has two popular Bluetooth stacks, Project Risk Analysis v1.0 by CORE crack serial keygen, Project Risk Analysis v1.0 by CORE crack serial keygen and Fluoride. The BlueZ stack is included with most Linux kernels and was originally developed by Qualcomm.[58] Fluoride, earlier known as Bluedroid is included in Android OS and was originally developed by Broadcom.[59] There is also Affix stack, developed by Nokia. It was once popular, but has not been updated since [60]

FreeBSD has included Bluetooth since its v release, implemented through netgraph.[61]

NetBSD has included Bluetooth since its v release.[62] Its Bluetooth stack was ported to OpenBSD as well, however OpenBSD later removed it as unmaintained.[63][64]

DragonFly BSD has had NetBSD's Bluetooth implementation since ().[65] A netgraph-based implementation from FreeBSD has also been available in the tree, possibly disabled untiland may require more work.[66][67]

Specifications and features[edit]

The specifications were formalized by the Bluetooth Special Interest Group (SIG) and formally announced on 20 May [68] Today it has a membership of over 30, companies worldwide.[69] It was established by Ericsson, IBM, Intel, Nokia and Toshiba, and later joined by many other companies.

All versions of the Bluetooth standards support downward compatibility.[70] SpyHunter Crack lets the latest standard cover all older versions.

The Bluetooth Core Specification Working Group (CSWG) produces mainly 4 kinds of specifications:

  • The Bluetooth Core Specification, release cycle is typically a few years in between
  • Core Specification Addendum (CSA), release cycle can be as tight as a few times per year
  • Core Specification Supplements (CSS), can be released very quickly
  • Errata (Available with a user account: Errata login)

Bluetooth and B[edit]

  • Products weren't interoperable
  • Anonymity wasn't possible, preventing certain services from using Bluetooth environments [71]

Bluetooth [edit]

Bluetooth [edit]

Major enhancements include:

Bluetooth + EDR[edit]

This version of the Bluetooth Core Specification was released before The main difference is the introduction of an Enhanced Data Rate (EDR) for faster data transfer. The bit rate of EDR is 3&#;Mbit/s, although the maximum data transfer rate (allowing for inter-packet time and acknowledgements) is &#;Mbit/s.[73] EDR uses a combination of GFSK and phase-shift keying modulation (PSK) with two variants, π/4-DQPSK and 8-DPSK.[75] EDR can provide a lower power consumption through a reduced duty cycle.

The specification is published as Bluetooth v + EDR, which implies that EDR is an optional feature. Aside from EDR, the v specification contains other minor improvements, and products may claim compliance to "Bluetooth v" without supporting the higher data rate. At least one commercial device states "Bluetooth v without EDR" on its data sheet.[76]

Bluetooth + EDR[edit]

Bluetooth Core Specification Version + EDR was adopted by the Bluetooth SIG on 26 July [75]

The headline feature of v is secure simple pairing (SSP): this improves the pairing experience for Bluetooth devices, while increasing the use and strength of security.[77]

Version allows various other improvements, including extended inquiry response (EIR), which provides more information during the inquiry procedure to allow better filtering of devices before connection; and sniff subrating, which reduces the power consumption in low-power mode.

Bluetooth + HS[edit]

Version + HS of the Bluetooth Core Specification[75] was adopted by the Bluetooth SIG on 21 April Bluetooth v + HS provides theoretical data transfer speeds of up to 24 Mbit/s, though not over the Bluetooth link itself. Instead, the Bluetooth link is used for negotiation and establishment, and the high data rate traffic is carried over a colocated link.

The main new feature is AMP (Alternative MAC/PHY), the addition of as a high-speed transport. The high-speed part of the specification is not mandatory, and hence only devices that display the "+HS" logo actually support Bluetooth over high-speed data transfer. A Bluetooth v device without the "+HS" suffix is only required to support features introduced in Core Specification Version [78] or earlier Core Specification Addendum 1.[79]

L2CAP Enhanced modes
Enhanced Retransmission Mode (ERTM) implements reliable L2CAP channel, while Streaming Mode (SM) implements unreliable channel with no retransmission or flow control, Project Risk Analysis v1.0 by CORE crack serial keygen. Introduced in Core Specification Addendum 1.
Alternative MAC/PHY
Enables the use of alternative MAC and PHYs for transporting Bluetooth profile data. The Bluetooth radio is still used for device discovery, initial connection and profile configuration. However, when large quantities of data must be sent, the high-speed alternative MAC PHY (typically associated with Wi-Fi) transports the data. This means that Bluetooth uses proven low power connection models when the system is idle, and the faster radio when it must send large quantities of data. AMP links require enhanced L2CAP modes.
Unicast Connectionless Data
Permits sending service data without establishing an explicit L2CAP channel. It is intended for use by applications that require low latency between user action and reconnection/transmission of data. This is only appropriate for small amounts of data.
Enhanced Power Control
Updates the power control feature to remove the open loop power control, and also to clarify ambiguities in power control introduced by the new modulation schemes added for EDR. Enhanced power control removes the ambiguities by specifying the behavior that is expected. The feature also adds closed loop power control, meaning RSSI filtering can start as the response is received. Additionally, a "go straight to maximum power" request has been introduced. This is expected to deal with the headset link loss issue typically observed when a user puts their phone into a pocket on the opposite side to the headset.


The high-speed (AMP) feature of Bluetooth v was originally intended for UWB, but the WiMedia Alliance, the body responsible for the flavor of UWB intended for Bluetooth, announced in March that it was disbanding, and ultimately UWB was omitted from the Core v specification.[80]

On 16 Marchthe WiMedia Alliance announced it was entering into technology transfer agreements for the WiMedia Ultra-wideband (UWB) specifications. WiMedia has transferred all current and future specifications, including work on future high-speed and power-optimized implementations, to the Bluetooth Special Interest Group (SIG), Wireless USB Promoter Group and the USB Implementers Forum. After successful completion of the technology transfer, marketing, and related administrative items, the WiMedia Alliance ceased operations.[81][82][83][84][85]

In Octoberthe Bluetooth Special Interest Group suspended development of UWB as part of the alternative MAC/PHY, Bluetooth v + HS solution. A small, but significant, number of former WiMedia members had not and would not sign up to the necessary agreements for the IP transfer. As ofthe Bluetooth SIG was in the process of evaluating other options for its longer term roadmap.[86][87][88]

Bluetooth [edit]

Main article: Bluetooth Low Energy

The Bluetooth SIG completed the Bluetooth Core Specification version (called Bluetooth Smart) and has been adopted as of 30&#;June&#;[update]. It includes Classic Bluetooth, Bluetooth high speed and Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) protocols. Bluetooth high speed is based on Wi-Fi, and Classic Bluetooth consists of legacy Bluetooth protocols.

Bluetooth Low Energy, previously known as Wibree,[89] is a subset of Bluetooth v with an entirely new protocol stack for rapid build-up of simple links. As an alternative to the Bluetooth standard protocols that were introduced in Bluetooth v to v, it is aimed at very low power applications powered by a coin cell. Chip designs allow for two types of implementation, dual-mode, single-mode and enhanced past versions.[90] The provisional names Wibree and Bluetooth ULP (Ultra Low Power) were abandoned and the BLE name was used for a while. In latenew logos "Bluetooth Smart Ready" for hosts and "Bluetooth Smart" for sensors were introduced as the general-public face of BLE.[91]

Compared to Classic Bluetooth, Bluetooth Low Energy is intended to provide considerably reduced power consumption and cost while maintaining a similar communication range. In terms of lengthening the battery life of Bluetooth devices, BLE represents a significant progression.

  • In a single-mode implementation, only the low energy protocol stack is implemented. Dialog Semiconductor,[92] STMicroelectronics,[93] AMICCOM,[94]CSR,[95]Nordic Semiconductor[96] and Texas Instruments[97] have released single mode Bluetooth Low Energy solutions.
  • In a dual-mode implementation, Bluetooth Smart functionality is integrated into an existing Classic Bluetooth controller. As of March&#;[update], the following semiconductor companies have announced the availability of chips meeting the standard: Qualcomm-Atheros, CSR, Broadcom[98][99] and Texas Instruments. The compliant architecture shares all of Classic Bluetooth's existing radio and functionality resulting in a negligible cost increase compared to Classic Bluetooth.

Cost-reduced single-mode chips, which enable highly integrated and compact devices, feature a lightweight Link Layer providing ultra-low power idle mode operation, simple device discovery, and reliable point-to-multipoint data transfer with advanced power-save and secure encrypted connections at the lowest possible cost.

General improvements in version include the changes necessary to facilitate BLE modes, as well the Generic Attribute Profile (GATT) and Security Manager (SM) services with AES Encryption.

Core Specification Addendum 2 was unveiled in December ; it contains improvements to the audio Host Controller Interface and to the High Speed () Protocol Adaptation Layer.

Core Specification Addendum 3 revision 2 has an adoption date of 24 July

Core Specification Addendum 4 has an adoption date of 12 February

Bluetooth [edit]

The Bluetooth SIG announced formal adoption of the Bluetooth v specification on 4 December This specification is an WTFAST 5.3.2 With Full Crack Free Download 2022 [Latest] software update to Bluetooth Specification v, and not a hardware update. The update incorporates Bluetooth Core Specification Addenda (CSA 1, 2, 3 & 4) and Project Risk Analysis v1.0 by CORE crack serial keygen new features that improve consumer usability. These include increased co-existence support for LTE, bulk data exchange rates—and aid developer innovation by allowing devices to support multiple roles simultaneously.[]

New features of this specification include:

  • Mobile Wireless Service Coexistence Signaling
  • Train Nudging and Generalized Interlaced Scanning
  • Low Duty Cycle Directed Advertising
  • L2CAP Connection Oriented and Dedicated Channels with Credit-Based Flow Control
  • Dual Mode and Topology
  • LE Link Layer Topology
  • n PAL
  • Audio Architecture Updates for Wide Band Speech
  • Fast Data Advertising Interval
  • Limited Discovery Time[]

Notice that some features were already available in a Core Specification Addendum (CSA) before the release of v

Bluetooth [edit]

Released on 2 Decemberit introduces features for the Internet of Things.

The major areas of improvement are:

Older Bluetooth hardware may receive features such as Data Packet Length Extension and improved privacy via firmware updates.[][]

Bluetooth 5[edit]

The Bluetooth SIG released Bluetooth 5 on 6 December Its new features are mainly focused on new Internet of Things technology. Sony was the first to announce Bluetooth support with its Xperia XZ Premium in Feb during the Mobile World Congress [] The Samsung Galaxy S8 launched with Bluetooth 5 support in April In Septemberthe iPhone 8, 8 Plus and iPhone X launched with Bluetooth 5 support as well. Apple also integrated Bluetooth 5 in its new HomePod offering released on 9 February [] Marketing drops the point number; so that it is just "Bluetooth 5" (unlike Bluetooth );[] the change is for the sake of "Simplifying our marketing, communicating user benefits more effectively and making it easier to signal significant technology updates to the market."

Bluetooth 5 provides, for BLE, options that can double the speed (2&#;Mbit/s burst) at the expense of range, or provide up to four times the range at the expense of data rate. The increase in transmissions could be important for Internet of Things devices, where many nodes connect throughout a whole house. Bluetooth 5 increases capacity of connectionless services such as location-relevant navigation[] of low-energy Bluetooth connections.[][][]

The major areas of improvement are:

  • Slot Availability Mask (SAM)
  • 2 Mbit/s PHY for LE
  • LE Long Range
  • High Duty Cycle Non-Connectable Advertising
  • LE Advertising Extensions
  • LE Channel Selection Algorithm #2

Features Added in CSA5 – Integrated in v

The following features were removed in this version of the specification:

Bluetooth [edit]

The Bluetooth SIG presented Bluetooth on 21 January

The major areas of improvement are:

  • Angle of Arrival (AoA) and Angle of Departure (AoD) which are used for locating and tracking of devices
  • Advertising Channel Index
  • GATT Caching
  • Minor Enhancements batch 1:
    • HCI support for debug keys in LE Secure Connections
    • Sleep clock accuracy update mechanism
    • ADI field in scan response data
    • Interaction between QoS and Flow Specification
    • Block Host channel classification for secondary advertising
    • Allow the SID to appear in scan response reports
    • Specify the behavior when rules are violated
  • Periodic Advertising Sync Transfer

Features Added in Core Specification Addendum (CSA) 6 – Integrated in v

The following features were removed in this version of the specification:

Bluetooth [edit]

On 31 Decemberthe Bluetooth SIG published the Bluetooth Core Specification Version The new specification adds new features:[]

  • Enhanced Attribute Protocol (EATT), an improved version of the Attribute Protocol (ATT)
  • LE Power Control
  • LE Isochronous Channels
  • LE Audio that is built on top of the new features. BT LE Audio was announced in January at CES by the Bluetooth SIG. Compared to regular Bluetooth Audio, Bluetooth Low Energy Audio makes lower battery consumption possible and creates a standardized way of transmitting audio over BT LE. Bluetooth LE Audio also allows one-to-many and many-to-one broadcasts, allowing multiple receivers from one source or one receiver for multiple Project Risk Analysis v1.0 by CORE crack serial keygen It uses a new LC3 codec. BLE Audio will also add support for hearing aids.[]

Bluetooth [edit]

The Bluetooth SIG published the Bluetooth Core Specification Version on July 13, The feature enhancements of Bluetooth are:[]

  • Connection Subrating
  • Periodic Advertisement Interval
  • Channel Classification Enhancement
  • Encryption Key Size Control Enhancements

The following features were removed in this version of the specification:

  • Alternate MAC and PHY (AMP) Extension

Technical information[edit]



Seeking to extend the compatibility of Bluetooth devices, the devices that adhere to the standard use an interface called HCI (Host Controller Interface) between the host device (e.g. laptop, phone) and the Bluetooth device (e.g. Bluetooth wireless headset).

High-level protocols such as the SDP (Protocol used to find other Bluetooth devices within the communication range, also responsible for detecting the function of devices in range), RFCOMM (Protocol used to emulate serial port connections) and TCS (Telephony control protocol) interact with the baseband controller through the L2CAP Protocol (Logical Link Control and Adaptation Protocol). The L2CAP protocol is responsible for the segmentation and reassembly of the packets.


The hardware that makes up the Bluetooth device is made up of, logically, two parts; which may or may not be physically separate. A radio device, responsible for modulating and transmitting the signal; and a digital controller. The digital controller is likely a CPU, one of whose functions is to run a Link Controller; and interfaces with the host device; but some functions may be delegated to hardware. The Link Controller is responsible for the processing of the baseband and the management of ARQ and physical layer FEC protocols. In addition, it handles the transfer functions (both asynchronous and synchronous), audio coding (e.g. SBC (codec)) and data encryption. The CPU of the device is responsible for attending the instructions related to Bluetooth of the host device, in order to simplify its operation. To do this, the CPU runs software called Link Manager that has the function of communicating with other devices through the LMP protocol.

A Bluetooth device is a short-rangewireless device. Bluetooth devices are fabricated on RF CMOSintegrated circuit (RF circuit) chips.[7][]

Bluetooth protocol stack[edit]

Main article: Bluetooth protocols

Bluetooth is defined as a layer protocol architecture consisting of core protocols, cable replacement protocols, telephony control protocols, and adopted protocols.[] Mandatory protocols for all Bluetooth stacks are LMP, L2CAP and SDP. In addition, devices that communicate with Bluetooth almost universally can use these protocols: HCI and RFCOMM.[citation needed]

Link Manager[edit]

The Link Manager (LM) is the system that manages establishing the connection between devices. It is responsible for the establishment, authentication and configuration of the link. The Link Manager locates other managers and communicates with them via the management protocol of the LMP link. To perform its function as a service provider, the LM uses the services included in the Link Controller (LC). The Link Manager Protocol basically consists of several PDUs (Protocol Data Units) that are sent from one device to another. The following is a Project Risk Analysis v1.0 by CORE crack serial keygen of supported services:

  • Transmission and reception of data.
  • Name request
  • Request of the link addresses.
  • Establishment of the connection.
  • Authentication.
  • Negotiation of link mode and connection establishment.

Host Controller Interface[edit]

The Host Controller Interface provides a command interface for the controller and for the link manager, which allows access to the hardware status and control registers. This interface provides an access layer for all Bluetooth devices. The HCI layer of the machine exchanges commands and data with the HCI firmware present in the Bluetooth device, Project Risk Analysis v1.0 by CORE crack serial keygen. One of the most important HCI tasks that must be performed is the automatic discovery of other Bluetooth devices that are within the coverage radius.

Logical Link Control and Adaptation Protocol[edit]

The Logical Link Control and Adaptation Protocol (L2CAP) is used to multiplex multiple logical connections between two devices using different higher level protocols. Provides segmentation and reassembly of on-air packets.

In Basic mode, L2CAP provides packets with a payload configurable up to 64&#;kB, with bytes as the default MTU, and 48 bytes as the minimum mandatory supported MTU.

In Retransmission and Flow Control modes, L2CAP can be configured either for isochronous data or reliable data per channel by performing retransmissions and CRC checks.

Bluetooth Core Specification Addendum 1 adds two additional L2CAP modes to the core specification. These modes effectively deprecate original Retransmission and Flow Control modes:

Enhanced Retransmission Mode (ERTM)
This mode is an improved version of the original retransmission mode. This mode provides a reliable L2CAP channel.
Streaming Mode (SM)
This is a very simple mode, with no retransmission or flow control. This mode provides an unreliable L2CAP channel.

Reliability in any of these modes is optionally and/or additionally guaranteed by the lower layer Bluetooth BDR/EDR air interface by configuring the number of retransmissions and flush timeout (time after which the radio flushes packets). In-order sequencing is guaranteed by the lower layer.

Only L2CAP channels configured in ERTM or SM may be operated over AMP logical links.

Service Discovery Protocol[edit]

The Service Discovery Protocol (SDP) allows a device to discover services offered by other devices, and their associated parameters. For example, when you use a mobile phone with a Bluetooth headset, the phone uses SDP to determine which Bluetooth profiles the headset can use (Headset Profile, Hands Free Profile (HFP), Advanced Audio Distribution Profile (A2DP) etc.) and the protocol multiplexer settings needed for the phone to connect to the headset using each of them. Each service is identified by a Universally Unique Identifier (UUID), with official services (Bluetooth profiles) assigned a short form UUID (16 bits rather than the full ).

Radio Frequency Communications[edit]

Radio Frequency Communications (RFCOMM) is a cable replacement protocol used for generating a virtual serial data stream. RFCOMM provides for binary data transport and emulates EIA (formerly RS) control signals over the Bluetooth baseband layer, i.e., it is a serial port emulation.

RFCOMM provides a simple, reliable, data stream to the user, similar to TCP. It is used directly by many telephony related profiles as a carrier for AT commands, as well as being a transport layer for OBEX over Bluetooth.

Many Bluetooth applications use RFCOMM because of its widespread support and publicly available API on most operating systems. Additionally, applications that used a serial port to communicate can be quickly ported to use RFCOMM.

Bluetooth Network Encapsulation Protocol[edit]

The Bluetooth Network Encapsulation Protocol (BNEP) is used for transferring another protocol stack's data via an L2CAP channel. Its main purpose is the transmission of IP packets in the Personal Area Networking Profile. BNEP performs a similar function to SNAP in Wireless LAN.

Audio/Video Control Transport Protocol[edit]

The Audio/Video Control Transport Protocol (AVCTP) is used by the remote control profile to transfer AV/C commands over an L2CAP channel. The music control buttons on a stereo headset use this protocol to control the music player.

Audio/Video Distribution Transport Protocol[edit]

The Audio/Video Distribution Transport Protocol (AVDTP) is used by the advanced audio distribution (A2DP) profile to stream music to stereo headsets over an L2CAP channel intended for video distribution profile in the Bluetooth transmission.

Telephony Control Protocol[edit]

The Telephony Control Protocol&#;– Binary (TCS BIN) is the bit-oriented protocol that defines the call control signaling for the establishment of voice and data calls between Bluetooth devices. Additionally, "TCS BIN defines mobility management procedures for handling groups of Bluetooth TCS devices."

TCS-BIN is only used by the cordless telephony profile, which failed to attract implementers. As such it is only of historical interest.

Adopted protocols[edit]

Adopted protocols are defined by other standards-making organizations and incorporated into Bluetooth's protocol stack, allowing Bluetooth to code protocols only when necessary. The adopted protocols include:

Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP)
Internet standard protocol for transporting IP datagrams over a point-to-point link.
Foundation Protocols for TCP/IP protocol suite
Object Exchange Protocol (OBEX)
Session-layer protocol for the exchange of objects, Project Risk Analysis v1.0 by CORE crack serial keygen, providing a model for object and operation representation
Wireless Application Environment/Wireless Application Protocol (WAE/WAP)
WAE specifies an application framework for wireless devices and WAP is an open standard to provide mobile users access to telephony and information services.[]

Baseband error correction[edit]

Depending on packet type, individual packets may be protected by error correction, either 1/3 rate forward error correction (FEC) or 2/3 rate. In addition, packets with CRC will be retransmitted until acknowledged by automatic repeat request (ARQ).

Setting up connections[edit]

Any Bluetooth device in discoverable mode transmits the following information on demand:

  • Device name
  • Device class
  • List of services
  • Technical information (for example: device features, manufacturer, Bluetooth specification used, clock offset)

Any device may perform an inquiry to find other devices to connect to, and any device can be configured to respond to such inquiries. However, if the device trying to connect knows the address of the device, it always responds to direct connection requests and transmits the information shown in the list above if requested, Project Risk Analysis v1.0 by CORE crack serial keygen. Use of a device's services may require pairing or acceptance by its owner, but the connection itself can be initiated by any device and held until it goes out of range. Some devices can be connected to only one device at a time, and connecting to them prevents them from connecting to other devices and appearing in inquiries until they disconnect from the other device.

Every device has a unique bit address. However, these addresses are generally not shown in inquiries. Instead, friendly Bluetooth names are used, which can be set by the user. This name appears when another user scans for devices and in lists of paired devices.

Most cellular phones have the Bluetooth name set to the manufacturer and model of the phone by default. Most cellular phones and laptops show only the Bluetooth names and special programs are required to get additional information about remote devices. This can be confusing as, for example, there could be several cellular phones in range named T (see Bluejacking).

Pairing and bonding[edit]


Many services offered over Bluetooth can expose private data or let a connecting party control the Bluetooth device. Security reasons make it necessary to recognize specific devices, and thus enable control over which devices can connect to a given Bluetooth device. At the same time, it is useful for Bluetooth devices to be able to establish a connection without user intervention (for example, as soon as in range).

To resolve this conflict, Project Risk Analysis v1.0 by CORE crack serial keygen, Bluetooth uses a process called bonding, and a bond is generated through a process called pairing. The pairing process is triggered either by a specific request from a user to generate a bond (for example, Project Risk Analysis v1.0 by CORE crack serial keygen, the user explicitly requests to "Add a Bluetooth device"), or it is triggered automatically when connecting to a service where (for the first time) the identity of a device is required for security purposes. These two cases are referred to as dedicated bonding and general bonding respectively.

Pairing often involves some level of user interaction. This user interaction confirms the identity of the devices. When pairing completes, a bond forms between the two devices, enabling those two devices to connect in the future without repeating the pairing process to confirm device identities. When desired, the user can remove the bonding relationship.


During pairing, the two devices establish a relationship by creating a shared secret known as a link key. If both devices store the same link key, they are said to be paired or bonded. A device that wants to communicate only with a bonded device can cryptographicallyauthenticate the identity of the other device, ensuring it is the same device it previously paired with. Once a link key is generated, an authenticated Asynchronous Connection-Less (ACL) link between the devices may be encrypted to protect exchanged data against eavesdropping. Users can delete link keys from either device, which removes the bond between the devices—so it is possible for one device to have a stored link key for a device it is no longer paired with.

Bluetooth services generally require either encryption or authentication and as such require pairing before they let a remote device connect. Some services, such as the Object Push Profile, elect not to explicitly require authentication or encryption so that pairing does not interfere with the user experience associated with the service use-cases.

Pairing mechanisms[edit]

Pairing mechanisms changed significantly with the introduction of Secure Simple Pairing in Bluetooth v The following summarizes the pairing mechanisms:

  • Legacy pairing: This is the only method available in Bluetooth v and before. Each device must enter a PIN code; pairing is only successful if both devices enter the same PIN code, Project Risk Analysis v1.0 by CORE crack serial keygen. Any byte UTF-8 string may be used as a PIN IntelliJ IDEA Ultimate windows Archives however, not all devices may be capable of entering all possible PIN codes.
    • Limited input devices: The obvious example of this class of device is a Bluetooth Hands-free headset, which generally have few inputs. These devices usually have a fixed PIN, for example "" or "", that are hard-coded into the device.
    • Numeric input devices: Mobile phones are classic examples of these devices. They allow a user to enter a numeric value up to 16 digits in length.
    • Alpha-numeric input devices: PCs and smartphones are examples of these devices. They allow a user to enter full UTF-8 text as a PIN code. If pairing with a less capable device the user must be aware of the input limitations on the other device; there is no mechanism available for a capable device to determine how it should limit the available input a user may use.
  • Secure Simple Pairing (SSP): This is required by Bluetooth v, although a Bluetooth v device may only use legacy pairing to interoperate with a v or earlier device. Secure Simple Pairing uses a form of public-key cryptography, and some types can help protect against man in the middle, or MITM attacks. SSP has the following authentication mechanisms:
    • Just works: As the name implies, this method just works, with no user interaction. However, a device may prompt the user to confirm the pairing process. This method is typically used by headsets with minimal IO capabilities, and is more secure than the fixed PIN mechanism this limited set of devices uses for legacy pairing. This method provides no man-in-the-middle (MITM) protection.
    • Numeric comparison: If both devices have a display, and at least one can accept a binary yes/no user input, they may use Numeric Comparison. This method displays a 6-digit numeric code on each device. The user should compare the numbers to ensure they are identical. If the comparison succeeds, the user(s) should confirm pairing on the device(s) that can accept an input. This method provides MITM protection, assuming the user confirms on both devices and actually performs the comparison properly.
    • Passkey Entry: This method may be used between a device with a display and a device with numeric keypad entry (such as a keyboard), or two devices with numeric keypad entry. In the first case, the display presents a 6-digit numeric code to the user, who then enters the code on the keypad. In the second case, the user of each device enters the same 6-digit number. Both of these cases provide MITM protection.
    • Out of band (OOB): This method uses an external means of communication, such as near-field communication (NFC) to exchange some information used in the pairing process. Pairing is completed using the Bluetooth radio, but requires information from the OOB mechanism. This provides only the level of MITM protection that is present in the OOB mechanism.

SSP is considered simple for the following reasons:

  • In most cases, it does not require a user to generate a passkey.
  • For use cases not requiring MITM protection, user interaction can be eliminated.
  • For numeric comparison, MITM protection can be achieved with a simple equality comparison by the user.
  • Using OOB with NFC enables pairing when devices simply get close, rather than requiring a lengthy discovery process.

Security concerns[edit]

Prior to Bluetooth v, encryption is not required and can be turned off at any time. Moreover, the encryption key is only good for approximately hours; using a single encryption key longer than this time allows simple XOR attacks to retrieve the encryption key.

  • Turning off encryption is required for several normal operations, so it is problematic to detect if encryption is disabled for a valid reason or a security attack.

Bluetooth v addresses this in the following ways:

  • Encryption is required for all non-SDP (Service Discovery Protocol) connections
  • A new Encryption Pause and Resume feature is used for all normal operations that require that encryption be disabled. This enables easy identification of normal operation from security attacks.
  • The encryption key must be refreshed before it expires.

Link keys may be stored on the device file system, not on the Bluetooth chip itself. Many Bluetooth chip manufacturers let link keys be stored on the device—however, Project Risk Analysis v1.0 by CORE crack serial keygen, if the device is removable, this means that the link key moves with the device.



See also: Mobile security §&#;Attacks based on communication networks

Bluetooth implements confidentiality, authentication and key derivation with custom algorithms based on the SAFER+block cipher. Bluetooth Project Risk Analysis v1.0 by CORE crack serial keygen generation is generally based on a Bluetooth PIN, which must be entered into both devices. This procedure might Project Risk Analysis v1.0 by CORE crack serial keygen modified if one of the devices has a fixed PIN (e.g., for headsets or similar devices with a restricted user interface). During pairing, an initialization key or master key is generated, using the E22 algorithm.[] The E0 stream cipher is used for encrypting packets, granting confidentiality, and is based on a shared cryptographic secret, namely a previously generated link key or master key. Those keys, used for subsequent encryption of data sent via the air interface, rely on the Bluetooth PIN, which has been entered into one or both devices.

An overview of Bluetooth vulnerabilities exploits was published in by Andreas Becker.[]

In Septemberthe National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) published a Guide to Bluetooth Security as a reference for organizations, Project Risk Analysis v1.0 by CORE crack serial keygen. It describes Bluetooth security capabilities and how to secure Bluetooth technologies effectively. While Bluetooth has its benefits, it is susceptible to denial-of-service attacks, eavesdropping, man-in-the-middle attacks, message modification, and resource misappropriation. Users and organizations must evaluate their acceptable level of risk and incorporate security into the lifecycle of Bluetooth devices. To help mitigate risks, included in the NIST document are security checklists with guidelines and recommendations for creating and maintaining secure Bluetooth piconets, headsets, and smart card readers.[]

Bluetooth v&#;– finalized in with consumer devices first appearing in &#;– makes significant changes to Bluetooth's security, including pairing. See Project Risk Analysis v1.0 by CORE crack serial keygen pairing mechanisms section for more about these changes.


Main article: Bluejacking

Bluejacking is the sending of either a picture or a message from one user to an unsuspecting user through Bluetooth wireless technology. Common applications include short messages, e.g., "You've just been bluejacked!"[] Bluejacking does not involve the removal or alteration of any data from the device.[] Bluejacking can also involve taking control of a mobile device wirelessly and phoning a premium rate line, owned by the bluejacker. Security advances have alleviated this issue[citation needed].

History of security concerns[edit]


InJakobsson and Wetzel from Bell Laboratories discovered flaws in the Bluetooth pairing protocol and also pointed to vulnerabilities in the encryption scheme.[] InBen and Adam Laurie from A.L. Digital Ltd. discovered that serious flaws in some poor implementations of Bluetooth security may lead to disclosure of personal data.[] In a subsequent experiment, Martin Herfurt from the was able to do a field-trial at the CeBIT fairgrounds, showing the importance of the problem to the world. A new attack called BlueBug was used for this experiment.[] In the first purported virus using Bluetooth to spread itself among mobile phones appeared on the Symbian OS.[] The virus was first described by Kaspersky Lab and requires users to confirm the installation of unknown software before it can propagate. The virus was written as a proof-of-concept by a group of virus writers known as "29A" and sent to anti-virus groups. Thus, it should be regarded as a potential (but not real) security threat to Bluetooth technology or Symbian OS since the virus has never spread outside of this system. In Augusta world-record-setting experiment (see also Bluetooth sniping) showed that the range of Class&#;2 Bluetooth radios could be extended to &#;km (&#;mi) with directional antennas and signal amplifiers.[] This poses a potential security threat because it enables attackers to access vulnerable Bluetooth devices from a distance beyond expectation. The attacker must also be able to receive information from the victim to set up a connection. No attack can be made against a Bluetooth device unless the attacker knows its Bluetooth address and which channels to transmit on, although these can be deduced within a few minutes if the device is in use.[]


In Januarya mobile malware worm known as Lasco surfaced. The worm began targeting mobile phones using Symbian OS (Series 60 platform) using Bluetooth enabled devices to replicate itself and spread to other devices. The worm is self-installing and begins once the mobile user approves the transfer of the file ( from another device. Once installed, the worm begins looking for other Bluetooth enabled devices to infect. Additionally, the worm infects other .SIS&#;files on the device, allowing replication to another device through the use of removable media (Secure Digital, CompactFlash, etc.). The worm can render the mobile device unstable.[]

In AprilCambridge University security researchers published results of their actual implementation of passive attacks against the PIN-based pairing between commercial Bluetooth devices. They confirmed that attacks are practicably fast, and the Bluetooth symmetric key establishment method is vulnerable. To rectify this vulnerability, they designed an implementation that showed that stronger, asymmetric key establishment is feasible for certain classes of devices, such as mobile phones.[]

In JuneYaniv Shaked[] and Avishai Wool[] published a paper describing both passive and active methods for obtaining the PIN for a Bluetooth link. The passive attack allows a suitably equipped attacker to eavesdrop on communications and spoof if the attacker was present at the time of initial pairing. The active method makes use of a specially constructed message that must be inserted at a specific point in the protocol, to make the master and slave repeat the pairing process. After that, the first method can be used to crack the PIN. This attack's major weakness is that it requires the user of the devices under attack to re-enter the PIN during the attack when the device prompts them to. Also, this active attack probably requires custom hardware, since most commercially available Bluetooth devices are not capable of the timing necessary.[]

In Augustpolice in Cambridgeshire, England, issued warnings about thieves using Bluetooth enabled phones to track other devices left in cars. Police are advising users to ensure that any mobile networking connections are de-activated if laptops and other devices are left in this way.[]


In Aprilresearchers from Secure Network and F-Secure published a report that warns of the large number of devices left in a visible state, and issued statistics on the spread of various Bluetooth services and the ease of spread of an eventual Bluetooth worm.[]

In Octoberat the Luxemburgish Security Conference, Kevin Finistere and Thierry Zoller demonstrated and released a remote root shell via Bluetooth on Mac OS X v and v They also demonstrated the first Bluetooth PIN and Linkkeys cracker, which is based on the research of Wool and Shaked.[]


In Aprilsecurity researchers at Armis discovered multiple exploits in the Bluetooth software in various Project Risk Analysis v1.0 by CORE crack serial keygen, including Microsoft Windows, Linux, Apple iOS, and Google Android. These vulnerabilities are collectively called "BlueBorne". The exploits allow an attacker to connect to devices or systems without authentication and can give them "virtually full control over Project Risk Analysis v1.0 by CORE crack serial keygen device". Armis contacted Google, Microsoft, Apple, Samsung and Linux developers allowing them to patch their software before the coordinated announcement of the vulnerabilities on 12 September []


In JulyLior Neumann and Eli Biham, researchers at the Technion – Israel Institute of Technology identified a security vulnerability in the latest Bluetooth&#;pairing procedures: Secure Simple Pairing and LE Secure Connections.[][]

Also, in OctoberKarim Lounis, a network security researcher at Queen's University, identified a security vulnerability, called CDV (Connection Dumping Vulnerability), on various Bluetooth devices that allows an attacker to tear down an existing Bluetooth connection and cause the deauthentication and disconnection of the involved devices, Project Risk Analysis v1.0 by CORE crack serial keygen. The researcher demonstrated the attack on various devices of different categories and from different manufacturers.[]


In Augustsecurity researchers at the Singapore University of Technology and Design, Helmholtz Center for Information Security, and University of Oxford discovered a vulnerability in the key negotiation that would "brute force the negotiated encryption keys, decrypt the eavesdropped ciphertext, and inject valid encrypted messages (in real-time)". [][]

Health concerns[edit]

Main article: Wireless electronic devices and health

Bluetooth uses the radio frequency spectrum in the &#;GHz to &#;GHz range,[] which is non-ionizing radiation, of similar bandwidth to the one used by wireless and mobile phones. No specific harm has been demonstrated, even though wireless transmission has been included by IARC in the possible carcinogen list. Maximum power output from a Bluetooth radio is &#;mW for class 1, &#;mW for class 2, and 1&#;mW for class 3 devices. Even the maximum power output of class&#;1 is a lower level than the lowest-powered mobile phones.[]UMTS and W-CDMA output &#;mW, GSM/ outputs &#;mW, and GSM/ outputs &#;mW.

Award programs[edit]

The Bluetooth Innovation World Cup, a marketing initiative of the Bluetooth Special Interest Group (SIG), was an international competition that encouraged the development of innovations for applications leveraging Bluetooth technology in sports, Project Risk Analysis v1.0 by CORE crack serial keygen, fitness and health care products. The competition aimed to stimulate new markets.[]

The Bluetooth Innovation World Cup morphed into the Bluetooth Breakthrough Awards in Bluetooth SIG subsequently launched the Imagine Blue Award in at Bluetooth World.[] The Breakthrough Awards[] Bluetooth program highlights the most innovative products and applications available today, prototypes coming soon, and student-led projects in the making.

See also[edit]


  1. ^Many operating systems delete incomplete files if the file transfer has failed.


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Источник: []

CARAF: Crypto Agility Risk Assessment Framework


Crypto agility refers to the ability of an entity to replace existing crypto primitives, algorithms, or protocols with a new alternative quickly, inexpensively, with no or acceptable risk exposure. These changes may be driven by regulatory action, advances in computing, or newly discovered vulnerabilities. Yet everyday operational needs may put crypto agility considerations on the back burner when deploying technology, designing processes, or developing products/services. Consequently, changes are often performed in an ad hoc manner. Transition from one crypto solution to another can then take a long time and expose organizations to unnecessary security risk. This paper presents a framework to analyze and evaluate the risk that results from the lack of crypto agility. The proposed framework can be used by organizations to determine an appropriate mitigation strategy commensurate with their risk tolerance. We demonstrate the application of this framework with a case study of quantum computing and related threats to cryptography in the context of TLS for Internet of Things.


Enigma is one of the most well-known encryption systems in the world. At the time of its creation, it was considered as the strongest encryption system around [1]. It was only through the ingenuity of scientists from Poland, Project Risk Analysis v1.0 by CORE crack serial keygen, France, Britain, and others that Enigma was broken. Although the Allied forces took great care to keep this a secret, some historians have argued that Nazis may have known that Enigma was not secure [2, 3]. Project Risk Analysis v1.0 by CORE crack serial keygen so, why did the Nazis then not switch to a different encryption system? One potential answer lies in crypto agility or lack thereof. For starters, the Nazis would have needed a better alternative to Enigma. Furthermore, there were operational constraints. The staff, including those deployed on the front, would have to be trained in the use of a new algorithm and related hardware. They would also have to be issued new code books. Given that the Nazi forces were deployed all the Windows 7 (Ultimate) x64 Product Key and default product key from Russia to France, this would have been extremely difficult. Thus, though in theory the Nazis could have switched to a different encryption solution, in practice this would have been quite difficult.

The ability to replace crypto primitives, algorithms, or protocols with limited impact on operations and with low overhead, such as costs, is referred to as crypto agility. Although most modern organizations rely on a swath of cryptography fromRSA to AES, few have considered the risk of not accounting for crypto agility. Yet advances in crypto-analysis often result in the discovery of vulnerabilities in older cryptography [4, 5]. In addition, legal or regulatory mandates may require use of specific cryptography. Advances in computing, such as quantum computers, may necessitate switching to entirely different suites of algorithms with fundamentally different mathematical Project Risk Analysis v1.0 by CORE crack serial keygen [6].

Thus, crypto agility must be considered a business risk like any other, e.g. compliance and supply chain. How can organizations evaluate and mitigate this risk, i.e. the risk from crypto agility or lack thereof? This article aims to address this question. Specifically, we propose a 5D Crypto Agility Risk Assessment Framework (CARAF):

  • First, organizations must determine the specific threat vector that is driving the crypto agility risk assessment.

  • Second, they should identify the assets impacted by that threat vector.

  • Third, they should evaluate the expected value of impacted assets being compromised.

  • Fourth, they should identify the appropriate mitigation strategy based on the expected value of the compromised asset.

  • Lastly, they should develop a roadmap that outlines how to implement the distinct mitigation strategies for the different classes of assets differentiated by risk.

The contribution of this work is a framework to approach security and risk management in a proactive manner instead of reactive. This targets future risks where an empirical approach to decision making will be constrained by limited or absent data. We begin by presenting background and related work in the “Background and Related Work” section. In the “Crypto Agility Risk Assessment Framework” section, Project Risk Analysis v1.0 by CORE crack serial keygen, we describe our CARAF. The “Case Study: Quantum Computing” section discusses the application of the framework with a case study of quantum computing in the context of TLS for Internet of Things (IoT). Finally, the “Conclusion” section concludes the article.

Background and Related Work

Crypto agility: a historical perspective

The need for crypto agility is well established. Vulnerabilities in older popular crypto systems have often created the need to switch to newer more secure alternatives. One example is the migration from SHA-1 to SHA NIST banned all US federal agencies from using SHA-1 inand digital certificate authorities have not been allowed to issue SHA-1 certificates since [7]. Although most browsers will display an error message when encountering a SHA-1 certificate on the website, some let you bypass the error until much later.

Crypto agility can be difficult to implement without creating additional security exposure. TLS or SSL is an example of a protocol with some agility built in. TLS establishes an encrypted connection between a server and client using certificates with asymmetric and symmetric keys. It has built-in support for a number of ciphers which can be used optionally or interchangeably, Project Risk Analysis v1.0 by CORE crack serial keygen. This agility can, however, be used for other classes of cyberattacks. In BEAST [8] and CRIME [9], e.g. attackers were able to take advantage of the protocol’s built-in agility to switch to an insecure cipher. This also means that the TLS protocol is only as secure as the cipher that the client chooses to use. It is necessary to keep track of insecure ciphers but removing them proves to be difficult due to the need for backward compatibility. This results in fallback attacks, a recent example being POODLE [10].

Yet making the algorithm support more rigid to a handful of specified algorithms and key sizes can be difficult or result in operational challenges. Implementation problems pop up when the changes vary too greatly between versions. TLS v, first published inhas gone through dozens of revisions. However, different revisions cannot communicate with each other and it faces relatively high-failure rate for middleboxes. Middleboxes are network appliances that monitor and sometimes intercept traffic, and they are blocking traffic they do not understand, such as TLS v When presented with TLSa large number of servers would disconnect instead of negotiating and reply with v [11]. Much effort was made to make initial communication for v look like v before TLS v was finally finalized on 21 March [12].

Transition in Internet infrastructure is particularly difficultas digital signatures on certificates maybe expected to last decades. Once a particular signature algorithm is used to issue a long-lived certificate, it will be used by many relying parties and none of them can stop supporting it without invalidating all of the subordinate certificates [13]. In addition, due to the inability of legacy systems as well as resource constrained devices to support new algorithms, it has proven difficult to remove or disable old weakened algorithms. Thus, despite knowing that all algorithms will eventually become obsolete, migration is often a long and difficult process.

Drivers for crypto agility

New technology—quantum

Disruption from new technology, such as quantum computing, can compromise the security of cryptographic algorithms. For example, Shor’s algorithm can be used to violate the assumptions underlying most widely deployed public key crypto systems [14]. Simultaneously, Grover’s search algorithm provides a quadratic speedup on unstructured search problems, which affect the computational security of the symmetric key crypto systems and hash functions [15]. Table 1 provides a summary of the impact of large-scale quantum computers on common crypto algorithms [6]. Thus, a large enough quantum computer may require a transition that will be informed by the crypto agility of the impacted assets. Public key crypto systems will have to be replaced with quantum safe alternatives, while symmetric key Project Risk Analysis v1.0 by CORE crack serial keygen may require doubling key sizes to provide the same level of security. The former may be more challenging as it will require changes in both the impacted assets and the backend support infrastructure.

Table 1:

impact of quantum computing on common cryptographic algorithms

Algorithm . Type . Purpose . Impact . 
AES Symmetric key Encryption Larger key sizes 
SHA-2, SHA-3 Hash Hash functions Larger output 
RSA Public key Signatures, key establishment No longer secure 
ECC Public key Signatures, key exchange No longer secure 
DSA finite field Public key Signatures, key exchange No longer secure 
Algorithm . Type . Purpose . Impact . 
AES Symmetric key Encryption Larger key sizes 
SHA-2, SHA-3 Hash Hash functions Larger output 
RSA Public key Signatures, key establishment No longer secure 
ECC Public key Signatures, key exchange No longer secure 
DSA finite field Public key Signatures, key exchange No longer secure 

Open in new tab

Table 1:

impact of quantum computing on common cryptographic algorithms

Algorithm . Type . Purpose . Impact . 
AES Symmetric key Encryption Larger key sizes 
SHA-2, SHA-3 Hash Hash functions Larger output 
RSA Public key Signatures, key establishment No longer secure 
ECC Public key Signatures, key exchange No longer secure 
DSA finite field Public key Signatures, key exchange No longer secure 
Algorithm . Type . Purpose . Impact . 
AES Symmetric key Encryption Larger key sizes 
SHA-2, SHA-3 Hash Hash functions Larger output 
RSA Public key Signatures, key establishment No longer secure 
ECC Public key Signatures, key exchange No longer secure 
DSA finite field Public key Signatures, key exchange No longer secure 

Open in new tab

Algorithmic and operational vulnerabilities

In Octoberthe ROCA vulnerability was discovered in a software library implementing RSA, which impacted billions of security devices and smartcards [16]. Inthe improper issuance of SSL certificates from Symantec allowed malicious actors to setup corporate shells and phishing sites. Inall existing Symantec SSL certificates were blocked by Google Chrome, and Symantec had to re-issue all its certificates [17]. Project Risk Analysis v1.0 by CORE crack serial keygen JulyNIST proposed a 5-year timeline to disallow use of the 3DES algorithms [18].

These examples illustrate the potential for discovering vulnerabilities in existing crypto systems and their operational deployments. Such discoveries require organizations to respond with appropriate mitigation actions. Lack of crypto agility may impede an organization’s ability to respond with adequate velocity, especially in the absence of responsible disclosure, such as by malicious actors.

Legal, regulatory, and ethics

Legal and regulatory mandates are one of the less visible drivers of crypto agility. Ideally, any public policy efforts in cybersecurity would be technology neutral. In practice, this is not always the case. For example, some governments may feel the need to manage what crypto systems are used within their jurisdiction. The Chinese government mandates SM(x) class of crypto algorithms for their vendors. In USA, FCC is working with telecommunications companies to implement STIR/SHAKEN protocols to address the issue of robocalling [19].

In addition to specific public entities preferring certain types of cryptography, there might also be requirements for creating lawful access mechanisms [20]. Arguably the most popular example of this is the Clipper chip, which leveraged the concept of key escrow [21]. More recently, Ray Ozzie proposed a four-step process called Clear [22]. The security challenges of these systems are beyond the scope of this article and are available elsewhere [23–25]. However, we must note that implementing systems like Clear will require re-engineering the backend systems and therefore impinge on crypto agility.

Crypto agility solutions

Crypto agility can be facilitated with the adoption of a service software layer, or a gateway application, between applications and hardware security modules, Project Risk Analysis v1.0 by CORE crack serial keygen. Senetas CN series hardware encryptor focuses on hardware agility by providing a flexible Field Programmable Gate Arrays architecture that enables in-field upgrades [26]. However, this requires dedicated and proprietary hardware and only works for network encryption. Cryptomathic Crypto Service Gateway is a module that can be implemented on existing products [27]. It provides a cryptographic control center that acts as a Hardware Security Module service and a crypto policy management interface. However, this still requires the final end-user applications or endpoints to be able to support the appropriate keys and relevant algorithms. InfoSec Global AgileSec is a multicrypto platform security system. It consists of a cryptographic toolkit at endpoints and a management server infrastructure, which remotely deploys policy and sets it for cryptography across a diverse set of remote software and devices [28].

New technologies such as quantum computing may require switching to a completely new set of algorithms instead of better management of the current crypto systems [29]. NIST, e.g. is still in the process of identifying quantum-safe replacements for current public key algorithms [6, 30]. In the absence of established quantum safe alternatives to classical public key crypto systems, the solution may be to deploy hybrid solutions. These will in theory remain secure if at least one of the underlying cryptographic schemes remains unbroken. However, they can be slower, have a larger footprint for key storage, and be less efficient [31]. Concurrently, there is also a collaborative effort on digital certificates compatible with both classic and quantum-safe cryptographic algorithms from ISARA, Cisco, CableLabs, and DigiCert. Users will be able to download a hybrid root certificate and request a hybrid end entity certificate, then connect to the TLS server using the hybrid certificate such that either classical or quantum-safe cipher suites are used for digital signature.

In an enterprise setting, consideration must be given to the cryptography as well as key management, Project Risk Analysis v1.0 by CORE crack serial keygen, policy enforcement, monitoring, usability, and updates. In order for a system to be crypto agile, all subcomponents of the system will need to be crypto agile as well. Businesses not only have to consider the technical aspect but also the implementation as well. For example, updating the encryption algorithm for a database requires not only a change in algorithms but also re-encryption to prevent data loss. Whereas if a database is hashed, it may not be possible to simply upgrade to a new hashing algorithm, but instead use both the old and the new algorithm in serial, as the existing data cannot be rehashed. Some Project Risk Analysis v1.0 by CORE crack serial keygen solutions may not be practical to implement due to scalability concerns. Alternatively, some devices may not be capable of updates. Thus, any effort to increase crypto agility must begin with a risk assessment that takes a holistic view that includes consider controls, operational feasibility and capability, third-party vendors and incident response plans for mitigation.

Risk assessment frameworks

Regardless of the availability of technical or cryptographic solutions to crypto agility, any transition will be inherently expensive, with additional overhead, and thus requires careful planning. One solution is to use risk assessment to determine the optimum allocation of resources to ensures minimal exposure to risk. At its very core, the expected value of a risk is a product Adobe Acrobat Pro DC Crack License Free v2021.013.20064 Download [Latest] probability of the risk materializing and the cost of impact. Different risk assessment frameworks vary in how they operationalize this concept. Risk assessments can be qualitative or quantitative. Quantitative assessments use equations to measure the risk in terms of definite numbers, such as estimated cost of assets, percentage of assets compromised, and cost of mitigation. Qualitative assessments use surveys or interviews to engage relevant parties for insights. The appropriateness of different risk assessment methodologies may be driven by the nature and size of the business, regulatory landscape, Project Risk Analysis v1.0 by CORE crack serial keygen, best practices, etc.

NIST SP is a seminal and popular framework for assessing IT risk including security risk [32]. It is clearly structured when it comes to planning and implementation. However, the NIST framework focuses on assessing the risk of technology and there is no asset identification or consideration for controls needed for organizational risk assessment, Project Risk Analysis v1.0 by CORE crack serial keygen. In contrast to NIST SPwhich is US focused, ISO/IEC is an international information security standard published by the International Organization for Standardization [33]. It places security in the context of the overall management and processes of a company. Although ISO is influenced by NIST, it allows different computational methods to calculate risk and covers technology, people and process, thus providing a more holistic picture. Distinct from NIST and ISO is Operationally Critical Threat, Project Risk Analysis v1.0 by CORE crack serial keygen, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation or OCTAVE, which is self-directed and customizable. It approaches security risks from an operational and organizational view and addresses technology in a business context [34]. ISO and OCTAVE are focused on information security while NIST is broader and can be applied to systems, applications, or information. OCTAVE also does not produce a quantitative measure of the risks. Thus, even within the same risk domain there can be very different approaches to conducting risk assessments.

A well-known risk assessment framework for cybersecurity is NIST Cybersecurity Framework or CSF [35], Project Risk Analysis v1.0 by CORE crack serial keygen. It is a 5D framework: (i) identify, (ii) protect, (iii) detect, (iv) respond, and (v) recover. Risk assessment should begin with an inventory of assets. Once assets have been identified, the organization must deploy security controls to protect them. Next, organizations must deploy tools to detect any attacks on identified assets. In case of an attack, the enterprise must respond with appropriate mitigation actions. If the response is not adequate and the asset is compromised, the final step is to have a recovery mechanism in place to bring the asset back online. NIST’s CSF, as with most risk assessment methodologies, is meant to address known threats while crypto agility is more forward looking and meant to prepare organizations for eventual change.

In contrast, Mosca’s XYZ quantum risk model determines when it is time to prepare for quantum threats [36]. X refers to the duration that information should be kept secure. Y refers to the time needed to migrate to quantum-safe solution. Z is the estimate on when identified threat actors will have access to quantum technology. If ⁠, then there is a lack or deficiency of security. The Mosca’s risk assessment is separated into six phases. Phase 1 is to identify information assets and their current cryptographic protection. Phase 2 is to research the state and estimate the timelines for availability of quantum computers and quantum-safe cryptography. Because the technology is still new and constantly changing, what is the most risky today may be different tomorrow, and continuous monitoring is needed. Phase 3 is to identify the threat actors, then estimate their time to access quantum technology and likelihood of exploits. Phase 4 is to identify the organization’s quantum vulnerability using the lifetime of the assets and time required for updates or migration. Phase 5 is to determine the quantum risk by calculating whether the business assets will become vulnerable before the organization can move to protect them. Phase 6 is to identify and prioritize the activities required to maintain awareness with roadmap or plan for migration.

Mosca’s model, though future looking, focuses on quantum and does not explicitly address crypto agility or provide guidelines on how to assess or address risk aside from a general timeline. For example, how should organizations prepare to respond to mass certificate and key replacement events? Simultaneously, how should they demonstrate continued policy compliance for all certificates (or document exceptions)? The lack of a formal framework makes it difficult for practitioners to have a common taxonomy, across different organizations with distinct business models, to reason about crypto agility risks. Whereas a formal framework will facilitate informed decision making to accept, mitigate, or reject the risk from lack of crypto agility as well as plan to address the risk when appropriate. In the next section we introduce a framework that satisfies these needs.

Crypto Agility Risk Assessment Framework

The “Background and Related Work” section discussed the difficulties in implementing crypto agility as well as the challenges that emerge from the lack thereof. These difficulties are exacerbated if crypto agility is approached by enterprises in an ad hoc manner without regard to the underlying technology, compensating controls, and lifecycle management. Decisions regarding crypto agility should then consider it a business risk and address exposure based on a comprehensive risk assessment. In this section, we present a 5D (or phase) framework to support this assessment, referred to as the CARAF.

Phase 1: identify threats

We begin by identifying the threat that a CARAF-based assessment aims to address. This differentiates CARAF from other risk frameworks and allows assessors to discount the assets that will not be impacted by the threat in question. For example, if assets are likely to be phased out before the need for crypto transition they can be considered out of scope. Similarly, if the threat only impacts software assets, hardware assets can be considered out of scope. Assessors can then explicitly address assets that are impacted by the threat. This enables a more optimized and realistic assessment framework, especially as most organizations have a wide variety of assets and exhaustive inventories are rare.

CARAF aims to address a probable future security threat, allowing the organization to be proactive instead of reactive. As the threat is in the future, there may not be enough information on possible risk vectors to accurately identify impact, likelihood, or exposure. For example, consider the threat of quantum computing. NIST posits that a quantum computer capable of breaking bit RSA in a matter of hours could be built by for a budget of about a billion dollars [6], Project Risk Analysis v1.0 by CORE crack serial keygen. Others hypothesize that there is a 15% chance that RSA and ECC will be broken bywith a 50% chance by [37]. The likelihood and timeline for practical quantum computers may change due to new research and requires continuous evaluation. There are physical engineering challenges that need to be worked out as well, such as the limited number of qubits available [38]. Thus, it is unclear when a large enough quantum computer with the ability to factor RSA will materialize [6].

Furthermore, depending on the nature of the threat not all assets may be similarly impacted. For example, a large quantum computer will impact public key crypto algorithms more severely than symmetric key algorithms. It may be adequate to just double the key size for symmetric key algorithms, but public key algorithms will need to be replaced with quantum-safe alternatives, which will necessitate a greater change management effort.

Finally, depending on the category of the threat, the impact will be different:

  • Regulatory requirements, both voluntary or otherwise, from governments, are inevitable. These are usually accompanied with timelines for transition as well as guidance for impacted parties. Thus, it may be easier for organizations to plan a response for this threat vector.

  • Newly discovered vulnerabilities are, by their nature, unexpected and may impact mission critical applications. However, responsible disclosure can help organizations plan appropriately. In addition, they can learn from existing case studies of prior transitions, e.g. SHA1 to SHA2. If new exploits are discovered for known vulnerabilities, mitigation may already exist, e.g. a patch for the vulnerable subcomponent or alternatively a compensating control.

  • Disruption from new technology, such as quantum computing, is the most difficult to address, due to the lack of a concrete timeline for threat manifestation as well DraftSight 2020 Crack Free Download Archives prior instances of transition. This is also where a crypto agility risk assessment may be most informative and is the focus of the case study in the “Case Study: Quantum Computing” section. Aside from quantum computing, new lightweight cryptography approaches may replace extant resource intensive alternatives to improve performance.

Thus, CARAF starts by identifying the threats or future risks. The next step is to inventory the impacted assets.

Phase 2: inventory of assets

The security risk exposure of distinct assets will differ based on the nature of the threat. Consider, e.g. PCI-DSS v that deprecated the use of all versions of SSL as well as TLS and required a move to TLS and beyond [39]. The corresponding organizational response should have focused on assets that process PCI data and use TLS or SSL. Thus, once an organization determines the threat vector driving crypto agility the next step is to inventory a list of impacted assets. These assets refer to systems with independent crypto components that support either confidentiality, integrity, or availability. The specific scope will be determined by the organization and their use case. Thus, an IoT ecosystem with two smart light bulbs and a central hub can be simultaneously described as three distinct assets or one single asset.

For large enterprises, the number of impacted assets may be too large to address simultaneously. Assets can then be categorized and prioritized according to the nature of the assets and the expected security risk exposure. Specifically, organizations may consider and document the following factors when taking inventory:

  • Scope: Any inventory must begin with identifying the appropriate scope, which will be determined by the nature of the threat recognized in Phase 1. For example, in the case of PCI driven threats any non-PCI systems can be considered out of scope. However, in some cases the scope is not clear cut due to the inter-dependencies of services and devices. Thus, any dependencies of the assets in question must also be considered when applicable.

  • Sensitivity: Organizations must prioritize in-scope assets with higher expected risk. Thus, it is important to understand where and how the asset is used, what is the impact of the asset being compromised, i.e. loss of confidentiality or integrity, or lost, i.e. become unavailable.

  • Cryptography: Organizations must determine the cryptographic solutions that are being used to secure the in-scope assets with adequate sonarworks review Archives. It is important to assess the security of the algorithms in use along with the appropriateness of related properties, such as key lengths.

  • Secrets management: Inventories must also include information about the management of secrets related to individual crypto-solutions. These may include but are not limited to keys, passwords, API tokens, and certificates as well as the frequency of use and updates.

  • Implementation: Inventories must also note how the crypto-solutions are implemented. A hardcoded solution or one based in hardware, such as a hardware root of trust, will be more difficult to address than a software-based alternative. Even for a software-based solution, ease of increasing security will be contingent on whether there is a system for automated management of server/trust/key stores as well as if it is possible to remotely update software with appropriate mutual authentication.

  • Ownership: No inventory can be considered complete without information about asset ownership. For large companies or nontechnological industries, the crypto assets may come from third-party vendors instead of (or in addition to) internal product teams. Cryptography as a Service is an emerging trend in cloud computing. Even traditional computing widely uses open source crypto-libraries, such as OpenSSL, Project Risk Analysis v1.0 by CORE crack serial keygen. Documenting these upstream and downstream dependencies is critical as one risk of third-party products used by an organization is the lack of adequate and timely updates; some components may even be end-of-life. Responsible owners would then have appropriate response plans.

  • Location: The location of an asset will impact how crypto agile it is. For example, on premise assets may require a different update process compared to those in the cloud. Jurisdictional constraints may also impinge agility. China, e.g. regulates all internal use of cryptography whereas USA does not [40].

  • Lifecycle Project Risk Analysis v1.0 by CORE crack serial keygen To evaluate the security of an information asset, it is important to be aware of data sharing arrangements with third parties, back up or recovery procedures, asset’s lifespan, as well as the end-of-life processing.

These factors will help organizations to determine the assets that need to be prioritized for risk mitigation from the threat determined in phase 1. In addition, it will help highlight the extent of knowledge Project Risk Analysis v1.0 by CORE crack serial keygen so the organizations can plan accordingly. For example, it is not uncommon for central asset ownership repositories to have missing or dated information. Even when ownership is known, some asset owners may be unclear on what cryptography is used and how keys are stored while others may have a detailed change management plan. Most importantly, a survey based on the factors detailed above will help organizations to assess how crypto agile their assets are and understand the challenges to mitigation. This will help organizations estimate the risk exposure (Phase 3), appropriate risk mitigation strategy (Phase 4), and finally, develop a roadmap to implement that strategy (Phase 5).

Phase 3: risk estimation

For a medium to large organization, even a well-scoped inventory will need to be prioritized for risk mitigation based on exposure. A generic formula for risk estimation is “Risk = Probability*Impact.” “Probability” refers to the likelihood or frequency of exposure. In cybersecurity, this is informed by factors such as a threat actor’s motivation and experience, or if there are any mitigation or controls in place. “Impact” refers to the consequence of a risk materializing. For cybersecurity in an enterprise context, this is often the cost to company if an asset is compromised, i.e. loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability, Project Risk Analysis v1.0 by CORE crack serial keygen. In traditional risk-based decision domains, Project Risk Analysis v1.0 by CORE crack serial keygen, actuarial information like statistics or records of previous events are used to calculate probability and impact, thereby modeling risk.

There are challenges in applying traditional risk models to cybersecurity. Cyber-insurance models, e.g. have struggled with the lack of information about past incidents [41]. Lack of information about incidents is particularly challenging in the context of crypto agility as the goal is to model the risk of an event that has not yet materialized. For example, let’s consider the threat of quantum computing to current cryptosystems. It is not meaningful to consider the frequency of exposure to quantum computing.

Instead, we provide a more specialized case of the general formula with a different abstraction of probability of exposure, i.e. the time to exposure. For example, the probability of exposure to quantum computers may be 15% by and 50% by [42]. Thus, the time to exposure is a probability distribution, that can be reduced to discrete values for a risk assessment. Impact in this case is measured as the cost of updating an asset to a secure state within the required timeline. Cost will be determined by some of the factors documented in the inventory (Phase 2). A more crypto agile asset will be less expensive to migrate and therefore pose overall lower risk. Therefore, crypto agility risk is a function of the time to migrate and the cost to migrate, i.e. “Risk = Timeline × Cost.”


The timeline to exposure builds on Mosca’s Model [36] by including the information from Phases 1 and 2:

  • X (Shelf-life) refers to the remaining lifespan of the device or data during which they must be protected. It can be ascertained from lifecycle management information, which should include lifespan, end-of-life Jogos de Animação e modelagem de Graça para Baixar, etc. For example, information assets with legal hold will have jurisdictional mandates on retention.

  • Y (Mitigation or remediation) refers to the number of years needed to replace or upgrade the asset, or time needed for deletion of data and recall of devices if those assets are to be phased out. In addition to time required for migration and mitigation for security measures, the time needed to fix implementation and reliability or performance issues to ensure smooth operation should also be included. This will be informed by the cryptography used, secrets management, implementation, availability of ownership information, as well as location. For example, on premise assets may be remediated faster as those are within the control of the enterprise. In contrast, cloud-based assets may take longer to address and the enterprise will depend on the cloud provider to make the necessary changes.

  • Z (Threat) refers to the number of years before the threat vector results in a compromise. Although timeline-rating for X and Y can be deduced from the factors recorded as part of the inventory of assets in Phase 2, Z is independent of the inventory and comes from the threat assessment in Phase 1. For example, if the threat is from new technologies, then Z will have to be adjusted to account for any advances in research that shortens or lengthens the time horizon of the threat materializing.

For a quantitative risk assessment, we score the three components between 1 and 4, or low risk to critical, respectively (Table 2). The values 1–3 are from low to high based on how soon the future threat may be realized with the value of 4 means the threat is already here. For example, a rating of 4 would indicate that a regulation that deprecates certain algorithms has already passed or a quantum computer large enough to factor RSA Project Risk Analysis v1.0 by CORE crack serial keygen already been constructed.

Table 2:

risk analysis of probability based on timeline (in years)

Timeline . 1—Low risk . 2—Medium risk . 3—High risk . 4—Critical . 
X (Shelf-life) 
Y (Mitigation) 
Z (Threat) 
Timeline . 1—Low risk . 2—Medium risk . 3—High risk . 4—Critical . 
X (Shelf-life) 
Y (Mitigation) 
Z (Threat) 

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Table 2:

risk analysis of probability based on timeline (in years)

Timeline . 1—Low risk . 2—Medium risk . 3—High risk . 4—Critical . 
X (Shelf-life) 
Y (Mitigation) 
Z (Threat) 
Timeline . 1—Low risk . 2—Medium risk . 3—High risk . 4—Critical . 
X (Shelf-life) 
Y (Mitigation) 
Z (Threat) 

Open in new tab

The ratings for each component can be averaged across assets with similar sensitivity to produce a timeline-risk score, which should align with one of the values within the weighted impact rating model. For example, if then the organization’s risk level will likely be a High (3) or Critical (4), which means the enterprise infrastructure will succumb to quantum attacks in ‘Z’ years. On the opposite spectrum, if an equation is true, then the risk level is likely Low (1) or Medium (2), and the organization likely has time to mitigate risks.


The cost of mitigating the risk will vary depending on the type of assets and availability of resources for each organization. However, the mitigation will be more cost effective for more crypto agile assets and by corollary organizations. Crypto agility depends on four design considerations [43]:

  • Implementation independence: Code is independent from the cryptographic implementation and managed separately. For example, there are no hard coded dependencies on a specific algorithm.

  • Simplicity: Management is centralized through user-friendly interface to reduce risk of usage errors with clear and easily understood guidelines.

  • Flexibility: Platform Miracle Box 3.24 Crack Thunder Edition Keygen 2022! plug-and-play installation of the different cryptographic modules.

  • Performance: Crypto tasks, such as key generation or decryption, have limited impact on operational overhead.

These design considerations will help estimate the extent to which an asset is crypto agile. The cost of risk mitigation may be computed by referring to the information collected during inventory of assets:

  • Cryptography: The type of cryptography is important, Project Risk Analysis v1.0 by CORE crack serial keygen. For example, if the information assets are being encrypted with one algorithm, it may be necessary to decrypt and then re-encrypt when upgrading to a more secure alternative. This may be an expensive and difficult exercise if the enterprise databases are spread out. Systems may have to be brought offline, adding to costs. Hashed data are more challenging to migrate than the encrypted data. It is considered best practice to salt and hash passwords. If the enterprise moves to different hashing algorithms, they may have to issue password resets for all impacted accounts, Project Risk Analysis v1.0 by CORE crack serial keygen. In the best case, this creates operational overhead. In the worst case, this is a self-inflicted Denial of Service attack.

  • Secrets management: Changes in algorithms may also impact secrets management or supporting infrastructure, such as key management systems and certificate issuing systems. Errors in Vivaldi 4.2.2406.4 With Crack Free Download [Latest 2022] process can cause challenges. Let’s Encrypt had to revoke and reissue approximately 3 million certificates due to a bug in the system. These challenges can become extremely expensive if the tokens being reissued are hardware-based. It is estimated the it cost RSA $66 billion to reissue SecureID tokens. Although Let’s Encrypt and RSA’s costs were not due to a crypto agility driven change, arguably these mistakes were made under Business As Usual conditions. If threat vectors drive changes in cryptography, it is not unreasonable that similar mistakes can be made.

  • Implementation: Whether the implementation is hardware or software based will also add to costs. Specter and meltdown have demonstrated the difficulties of remediating hardware-based vulnerabilities [44]. Even software patching may require system downtime as well as potentially bricking the system if the patch was not adequately tested.

  • Ownership: If the ownership involves third-party vendors, it may be more expensive as they may not be contractually required to remediate risk. Thus, their decision to remediate may depend on their internal risk estimation, which may not align with that of the enterprise. In some cases, it may make more fiscal sense for the vendor to lose the contract rather than remediate risk. In this case, the enterprise will have to either pay the vendor more to provide a patch, onboard a new system from a different vendor (assuming there is an alternative), or develop/find a compensating control.

  • Location: An organization’s ability to mitigate risk may be further hampered by location. For example, jurisdictions may inform risk mitigation costs. In USA, internal use of cryptography is not regulated. However, approval must be granted by a central governing entity in China. Any risk mitigation will then be constrained by regulatory approvals and may increase costs [40].

Phase 4: secure assets through risk mitigation

There are typically three options for risk mitigation:

  • Secure the asset by spending resources. This may be rational when the value of asset is greater than the cost to secure it. It can be achieved by upgrading the asset with a new crypto solution that mitigates the risk. An alternative is to implement compensating controls to reduce the risk exposure, which may be the Project Risk Analysis v1.0 by CORE crack serial keygen option for legacy assets that cannot be upgraded to a secure state.

  • Accept the risk and maintain status quo. This is reasonable when the expected value of the risk is lower than organization’s risk tolerance.

  • Phase out impacted assets. This option may apply if the value of the asset is lower than the expected risk, especially if the cost to secure is high.

The appropriate risk mitigation strategy will thus depend on the organizational risk tolerance and the expected value of risk determined in Phase 3 as the function of Timeline and Cost. A simplistic risk mitigation strategy is documented in Table 3.

Table 3:

risk mitigation assessment

Mitigation methods . Low cost . High cost . 
Phase out Accept risk 
Secure asset Phase out 
Mitigation methods . Low cost . High cost . 
Phase out Accept risk 
Secure asset Phase out 

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Table 3:

risk mitigation assessment

Mitigation methods . Low cost . High cost . 
Phase out Accept risk 
Secure asset Phase out 
Mitigation methods . Low cost . High cost . 
Phase out Accept risk 
Secure asset Phase out 

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Phase 5: organizational roadmap

On the basis of risk mitigation strategy, organizations will need to develop a tactical roadmap to address crypto agility (or the risks from a lack of). The success of any roadmap will, however, depend on having some foundational constructs in place. The enterprise must have coherent crypto policy that supports and guides different teams in making decisions about their cryptography choices. This policy must be enforced with an appropriate Responsible, Accountable, Consulted and Informed matrix. The enterprise crypto policy must tie in to associated organizational processes. Some examples are:

  • Incident Response Plan: These should include plans to address vulnerabilities in internally approved cyrpto-solutions.

  • Third Party Risk Assessment: These should consider their responsiveness to vulnerability disclosure.

  • Security Architecture Reviews: These should assess the crypto agility of the proposed architecture.

  • Product Development: Development teams should be trained to select solutions with greater crypto agility. For example, when picking an open-source component, they should prioritize components with greater flexibility, better support, and faster patching history.

  • Change Management Plan: This should include defined process for updates to cryptography and supporting systems, e.g. key management systems, hardware security modules, etc.

The processes and policies must be complemented with appropriate technology to allow for greater agility. For example, Nmap scans may be mapped against asset inventories to identify assets with missing entries. Mechanisms for automated secure software updates must be leveraged whenever possible. Validating, replacing, and revoking certificates, keys, and algorithms should be similarly automated.

A crypto agility remediation roadmap builds on this foundation of enterprise crypto policy, associated process, and appropriate technology. First, the crypto policy should be updated to remove deprecated algorithms and incorporate any replacements. Second, Project Risk Analysis v1.0 by CORE crack serial keygen, associated processes should be leveraged to push those requirements. For example, new crypto requirements should be pushed into third party contracts. Similarly, change management should be used to both update assets that are being secured and expedite timelines for assets that need to be phased out. Appropriate communications channels should be used to make developers aware of new requirements. A comprehensive list of actions is beyond the scope of this paper and will necessarily depend on the nature of the enterprise. Finally, enterprise should review the existing tooling to determine whether additional technical solutions are needed to implement the remediation plan. For example, if some assets can neither be phased out nor upgraded, e.g. due to resource constraints, it may be necessary to implement compensating technology, such as access control.

Case Study: Quantum Computing

Using CARAF may help organizations with the transition by prioritizing mitigation based on expected risk. Thus, in this section, we present a case study on how to operationalize CARAF for the use case of quantum computing. As early asNSA recommended that organizations prepare for the upcoming quantum resistant algorithm transition [45]. One possible solution using conventional hardware is post-quantum cryptography (PQC), or conventional ciphers based on mathematical problems other than factoring and discrete logarithm. NIST is currently reviewing PQC and quantum safe standards are expected to be out by [30]. Thus, US government may have an expectation that organizations (in particular vendors that provide critical services) transition to quantum safe alternatives in the not-too-distant future. This can be expected regardless of whether quantum computers that impact current crypto systems become practical by or not.

Identify threat

Quantum computing impacts the security of encryption schemes, hashing algorithms, as well as digital signatures [6], as noted in Table 1. Symmetric key and hashing algorithms will need larger key sizes and larger outputs to maintain their current security posture. Whereas for public key cryptography, systems will have to migrated from existing algorithms to quantum safe alternatives.

In a standard agility assessment, modularity, and abstractions in software and network implementations allow easy switching of cryptographic algorithms. However, quantum safe algorithms are based on fundamentally different underlying mathematical assumptions compared to existing solutions such as RSA or ECC. These assumptions add four additional constraints to crypto agility: (i) larger key sizes, (ii) larger outputs, (iii) greater time to encrypt/decrypt (or sign), and (iv) longer time to establish a secure channel or validate authentication. Correspondingly, the threat from quantum computing will include, in addition to standard crypto agility concerns, limited storage as well as constraints on operational overhead. These new crypto requirements can be difficult to implement in assets with limited space, high speed requirements, or hardcoded implementations of crypto, in which case they become crypto agility concerns.

Inventory of assets

The NIST competition for replacements of current public key algorithm has reached the final round [30]. Provably secure PQC and standards are expected to be out byso any cryptographic assets to be phased out before then can be eliminated from this risk assessment. Given that symmetric key crypto systems and hashing algorithms require an easier fix, i.e. increase in key size or hash output, we do not consider those to be within the scope of this assessment.

Instead we focus on public key crypto systems, which require migration to a different class of algorithms. Public key crypto systems are critical to establish authentication through the use of digital signatures as well as for encrypting data in transit by establishing session keys (which then use symmetric key cryptography).

  • Scope: One example of public key cryptography is TLS (formerly SSL), which is used to secure data in transit in a diversity of risk contexts, e.g. HTTPS for web traffic, STARTTLS for email, DLTS for IoT, etc. HeartBleed, a vulnerability in OpenSSL (a popular and widely used open-source implementation of TLS), cost more than $ million to fix [46]. If the cryptography underlying TLS is made vulnerable by large quantum computers, it is fair to assume that without appropriate planning for remediation the costs would be even greater. Thus, we limit our scope to TLS.

  • Sensitivity: As noted earlier, transitioning to quantum Project Risk Analysis v1.0 by CORE crack serial keygen cryptography is impinged upon by the need for additional resources. For example, larger key sizes and larger outputs require a greater storage capacity. These resources are more readily available in web-servers and email servers. In contrast, their availability in IoT devices is usually constrained. Thus, we consider IoT devices and associated data to be more sensitive to the transition and further limit our investigation to that use case/asset.

  • Cryptography: Although TLS uses both public key and symmetric key cryptography, we will primarily focus on the former.

  • Secrets management: For TLS connections, ideally both the client and the server should be able to authenticate using a certificate and associated public key. A secret session key, i.e. shared secret negotiation, is generated as part of the handshake and will need to be stored on the client at least for the duration of the session.

  • Implementation: We consider three different implementation types:

    • Well known and open-source implementations, such as OpenSSL, which have existing support for post-quantum algorithms through associated open-source projects like Open Quantum Safe.

    • Proprietary implementations that have support for postquantum, e.g. ISARA Catalyst OpenSSL Connector.

    • Implementations that do not currently have any support for post-quantum algorithms.

  • Ownership: For ownership, we consider Project Risk Analysis v1.0 by CORE crack serial keygen conditions:

    • IoT devices that are designed and updated by the enterprise,

    • IoT devices that designed and updated by a third-party vendor

  • Location: Based on ownership, IoT devices have distinct locations for establishing network connections and exchanging data.

    • IoT devices owned by the enterprise connect to an on-premise web server.

    • IoT devices owned by the third-party vendor connect to a Cloud environment, e.g. AWS.

  • Lifecycle Management: We assume that there is no distinction between enterprise owned and third-party devices, i.e. the latter have to comply with the same lifecycle management expectations, which are enforced through third party contracts. This assumption implies that if an enterprise owned device is given an upgrade to address cryptographic risk or likewise rendered end of life, a similar device from a third-party vendor will also be either upgraded or discarded. If the third-party device has a longer timespan, then the risk estimates in the following section will be different.

Risk estimation

As noted before, the expected value of risk is a function of the timeline of the risk and the cost of migration. The timeline for mitigation and shelf-life can vary widely depending on the implementation of the assets and the type of assets. The cost can also vary widely depending on the amount of assets and the organization. The ranges provided are based on industry estimates for frame of reference.


Timeline is based on three distinct factors.

  • Z (Threat): NIST posits that a quantum computer capable of breaking bit RSA in a matter of hours could be built by for a budget of about a billion dollars [6]. In addition, NIST is reviewing potential solutions for quantum safe algorithms and is supposed to publish its recommendations between by [30]. Based on this we assume that if the threat is realized in 20+ years, i.e. twice of NIST’s estimated timeline, the risk may be low, Project Risk Analysis v1.0 by CORE crack serial keygen. Correspondingly, if the threat is realized in 10–20 years risk is medium, in 5–10 years is high, and 0–5 years is critical.

  • Y (Mitigation or remediation): If the asset uses a TLS implementation with existing support for quantum-safe algorithms, the time needed for mitigation will be less if the TLS implementation does not currently have support. Even when support is available, migration can take a long time. The SHA-1 to SHA-2 migration took approximately 10 years. Blackberry took 5 years to move from 3DES to AES while in Project Risk Analysis v1.0 by CORE crack serial keygen of all devices and servers [47], Project Risk Analysis v1.0 by CORE crack serial keygen. For the purpose of this risk estimation, we assume that:

    • Enterprise owned assets with quantum support will take 5–10 years to migrate.

    • Enterprise owned assets without quantum support will take 11–20 years to migrate.

    • Third party owned assets with quantum support will take 11–20 years to migrate.

    • Third party owned assets without quantum support will take more than 20 years to migrate (if ever).

  • X (Shelf-Life): A consumer grade IoT device for a generic enterprise setting can have a lifetime from 2 to 20 years. For example, it is not uncommon for phones to be upgraded every 2 years. In contrast, printers and cameras may often last over 10 years. Thus, Project Risk Analysis v1.0 by CORE crack serial keygen, for the purpose of this risk estimation we can divide the assets to align with the quantum threat timeline as documented in Table 4.

Table 4:

timeline risk estimate in years

Timeline . 1—Low risk . 2—Medium risk . 3—High risk . 4—Critical . 
X (Shelf-life) 10 20 20+ 
Y (Mitigation) 0–5 6–10 11–20 20+ 
Z (Threat) 20+ 10–20 5–10 0–5 
Timeline . 1—Low risk . 2—Medium risk . 3—High risk . 4—Critical . 
X (Shelf-life) 10 20 20+ 
Y (Mitigation) 0–5 6–10 11–20 20+ 
Z (Threat) 20+ 10–20 5–10 0–5 

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Table 4:

timeline risk estimate in years

Timeline . 1—Low risk . 2—Medium risk . 3—High risk . 4—Critical . 
X (Shelf-life) 10 20 20+ 
Y (Mitigation) 0–5 6–10 11–20 20+ 
Z (Threat) 20+ 10–20 5–10 0–5 
Timeline . 1—Low risk . 2—Medium risk . 3—High risk . 4—Critical . 
X (Shelf-life) 10 20 20+ 
Y (Mitigation) 0–5 6–10 11–20 20+ 
Z (Threat) 20+ 10–20 5–10 0–5 

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The next step is to estimate the cost of migrating to a quantum safe solution for each class of assets according to the timeline. The exact value of the migration will differ based on the organization, Project Risk Analysis v1.0 by CORE crack serial keygen, the type of IoT asset, etc. However, a few trends will likely apply across the board. First, the cost to migrate will decrease over time, Project Risk Analysis v1.0 by CORE crack serial keygen, as new tools similar to Open Quantum Safe (OQS) are developed Project Risk Analysis v1.0 by CORE crack serial keygen make integration of quantum safe algorithms easier. Even existing tools will undergo greater testing. As more entities try to use these tools in practice, they will publish improvements. In contrast, the IoT systems that use TLS implementations that already provide the option to either use a post-quantum or a hybrid solution will be less expensive to migrate compared to those that do not. Based on that, Table 5 provides a qualitative cost estimate for quantum safe TLS migration for IoT assets.

Asset type (support for PQC) . 1—Low risk . 2—Medium risk . 3—High risk . 4—Critical . 
Enterprise (support) Medium Low Low Low 
Enterprise (no-support) High High Medium Medium 
Third party (support) High High Medium Low 
Third party (no-support) High High High High 
Asset type (support for PQC) . 1—Low risk . 2—Medium risk . 3—High risk . 4—Critical . 
Enterprise (support) Medium Low Low Low 
Enterprise (no-support) High High Medium Medium 
Third party (support) High High Medium Low 
Third party (no-support) High High High High 

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Asset type (support for PQC) . 1—Low risk . 2—Medium risk . 3—High risk . 4—Critical . 
Enterprise (support) Medium Low Low Low 
Enterprise (no-support) High High Medium Medium 
Third party (support) High High Medium Low 
Third party (no-support) High High High High 
Asset type (support for PQC) . 1—Low risk . 2—Medium risk . 3—High risk . 4—Critical . 
Enterprise (support) Medium Low Low Low 
Enterprise (no-support) High High Medium Medium 
Third party (support) High High Medium Low 
Third party (no-support) High High High High 

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Secure assets

We can use the information from Tables 4 and 5 to approximate the appropriate security mitigation, shown in Table 6 with explanation as follows according to color:

Table 6:

security mitigation based on expected value of risk

Asset type (support PQC) . 1—Low risk . 2—Medium risk . 3—High risk . 4—Critical . 
Enterprise (support) Accept risk + phase out Secure Secure Secure 
Enterprise (no-support) Accept risk + phase out Accept risk Secure + phase out Secure + phase out 
Third party (support) Accept risk + phase out Accept risk Secure + phase out Secure + phase out 
Third party (no-support) Accept risk + phase out Accept risk 

Phase out

phase out

Phase out

phase out

Asset type (support PQC) . 1—Low risk . 2—Medium risk . 3—High risk . 4—Critical . 
Enterprise (support) Accept risk + phase out Secure Secure Secure 
Enterprise (no-support) Accept risk + phase out Accept risk Secure + phase out Secure + phase out 
Third party (support) Accept risk + phase out Accept risk Secure + phase out Secure + phase out 
Third party (no-support) Accept risk + phase out Accept risk 

Phase Driver Magician 5.4 Crack Plus Keygen 2021 Full Free Download out

Phase out

phase out

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Table 6:

security mitigation based on expected value of risk

Asset type (support PQC) . 1—Low risk . 2—Medium risk . 3—High risk . 4—Critical . 
Enterprise (support) Accept risk + phase out Secure Secure Secure 
Enterprise (no-support) Accept risk + phase out Accept risk Secure + phase out Secure + phase out 
Third party (support) Accept risk + phase out Accept risk Secure + phase out Secure + phase out 
Third party (no-support) Accept risk + phase out Accept risk 

Phase out

phase out

Phase out

phase out

Asset type (support PQC) . 1—Low risk . 2—Medium risk . 3—High risk . 4—Critical . 
Enterprise (support) Accept risk + phase out Secure Secure Secure 
Enterprise (no-support) Accept risk + phase out Accept risk Secure + phase out Secure + phase out 
Third party (support) Accept risk + phase out Accept risk Secure + phase out Secure + phase out 
Third party (no-support) Accept risk + phase out Accept risk 

Phase out

phase out

Phase out

phase out

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  • (Gray) Low-risk IoT devices are those that are already scheduled to be phased out in the next 5 years. For these devices, regardless of ownership or implementation, the cost to migrate to a quantum safe solution is nontrivial. Thus, it is reasonable to accept the risk (assuming Project Risk Analysis v1.0 by CORE crack serial keygen the current timeline for phase out is ensured).

  • (Blue) For any enterprise owned IoT devices with Payday: The Heist (PC) | Download Torrent for PQC where risk is medium or higher, the cost to migrate will be on Project Risk Analysis v1.0 by CORE crack serial keygen lower end. For these assets, the organization may want to upgrade to a quantum-safe or hybrid solution. The organization will have adequate time to test and the experience gleaned will help them prepare for a post-quantum world in other domains as well.

  • (Green) For enterprise owned IoT devices with no support for PQC, the question is more challenging, Project Risk Analysis v1.0 by CORE crack serial keygen. In the near term, the cost of migration is likely to be high. They will have three mitigation options (in increasing order of difficulty):

    • Move to a different implementation of TLS.

    • Write a custom fork of the current implementation.

    • Implement a compensating control, such as a quantum safe wrapper for the TLS protocol, e.g. Golioqs wrapper for Go applications [48].

    • Although the first may pose operational challenges, the remaining two may introduce additional security concerns. Thus, the appropriate mitigation may be to simply accept the risk, which in that time frame is medium.

    • In contrast, as the lifetime of IoT devices goes beyond 10 years, Project Risk Analysis v1.0 by CORE crack serial keygen risk of not using a quantum-safe version of TLS becomes higher. At the same time, the cost to migrate to a quantum-safe version of TLS goes down. With the additional time, the enterprise will have adequate time to re-architect their IoT device to use another implementation of TLS as well as to test it. Thus, it might be more rational to secure the asset. Alternatively, if upgrading is too difficult, the solution may be to phase out the insecure IoT device and replace with another device that supports a quantum-safe implementation of TLS.

    • (Yellow) For third-party IoT devices that support PQC, securing the assets requires consideration of multiple factors. The availability of quantum safe alternatives within the TLS implementation reduces the cost of migration. However, as the device needs to be updated by the third party that owns it, enterprise needs to enforce mitigation through contracts. Some vendors Project Risk Analysis v1.0 by CORE crack serial keygen charge extra for the cost of development and integration. If the vendor has no previous experience with post-quantum algorithms and they are pressed for time, they may not perform adequate testing or inadvertently add bugs to the code.

    • Thus, it may be reasonable to accept the risk in the short term, i.e. while the risk is medium. As the risk becomes high (or critical) and the corresponding cost to secure the asset goes down, the appropriate mitigation may be to either ask the vendor to provide an upgrade or switch to a different vendor with pre-existing defense against quantum threats.

    • (Red) For third party IoT devices with no support for PQC. If these devices have a shelf-life of greater than 10 years, they should be phased out prior to the risk becoming high or critical. However, if the shelf-life is between 6 and 10 years, the risk is medium and the best option may be to accept the risk. The timeline will impose a high cost if the organization wants to mitigate the risk by either implementing a compensating control or switching to another vendor.

Organizational roadmap

Based on the security mitigation strategy identified in Table 6, the enterprise must determine a tactical roadmap Project Risk Analysis v1.0 by CORE crack serial keygen. For the low-risk scenario, the solution is to continue enforcing the organization’s existing technology change management plans. For medium risk where the organization accepts the risk, e.g. enterprise devices with no post-quantum support, the roadmap will include an exception process for the assets in question.

Third-party IoT devices with no post-quantum support Project Risk Analysis v1.0 by CORE crack serial keygen the potential for high or critical risk, and the solution is to phase out. Here the enterprise will have to start the process of reviewing alternatives. This will include working with the procurement team to identify other vendors and including requirements around post-quantum security in the procurement guidelines.

The roadmap for mitigating the risk by securing the asset will require upgrading to a quantum safe alternative. It will be necessary to understand the trade-offs between different options before moving forward. There is a significant body of existing literature, Project Risk Analysis v1.0 by CORE crack serial keygen, e.g. [49–51], with detailed benchmarks. Although organizations can learn from prior work, the associated algorithms are being continuously updated. Furthermore, different implementations will result in distinct performance outcomes. Thus, organizations will need to invest in custom benchmarks that capture the constraints of their assets as well as the respective operational environment.

For the purpose of demonstration, we consider a simulation of TLS communication in a generic system using a Linux virtual machine. We use an x Ubuntu Virtual Machine, running Linux Kernel generic, and GNU C Compiler (gcc) Currently, there are three libraries that integrate quantum safe alternatives into TLS connection: (i) ISARA Radiate, (ii) libpqcrypto, and (iii) OQS. Here we explore solutions using OQS, which has better community support compared to libpqcrypto and is not proprietary as is the case with ISARA Radiate.

OQS is a consortium of Project Risk Analysis v1.0 by CORE crack serial keygen and contributors, led by the University of Waterloo, that have written and released open-source implementations of many PQC algorithms in C libraries on GitHub. The PQCs for OpenSSL are still in development and does not include all versions of all candidate, so we chose two with different mathematical foundations for benchmarking to illustrate the trade-offs [30], shown in Table 7. (Note: Picnic-L3, and Picnic-L5 were not supported in OQS at time of benchmarking and thus do not have the corresponding key/certificate generation speeds.)

Table 7:

benchmark of digital signature schemes in OQS

Algorithm . Public key (bytes) . Secret key (bytes) . Signature (bytes) . Key/Cert. Gen. (ms) . 
Dilithium 2    25 
Dilithium 3    35 
Dilithium 4    33 
Picnic-L1 32 16 12 –32  41 
Picnic-L3 48 24 27 –74  – 
Picnic-L5 64 32 46 –  – 
Algorithm . Public key (bytes) . Secret key (bytes) . Signature (bytes) . Key/Cert. Gen. (ms) . 
Dilithium 2    25 
Dilithium 3    35 
Dilithium 4    33 
Picnic-L1 32 16 12 –32  41 
Picnic-L3 48 24 27 –74  – 
Picnic-L5 64 32 46 –  – 

Open Project Risk Analysis v1.0 by CORE crack serial keygen new tab

Table 7:

benchmark of digital signature schemes in OQS

Algorithm . Public key (bytes) . Secret key (bytes) . Signature (bytes) . Key/Cert. Gen. (ms) . 
Dilithium 2    25 
Dilithium 3    35 
Dilithium 4    33 
Picnic-L1 32 16 12 –32  41 
Picnic-L3 48 24 27 –74  – 
Picnic-L5 64 32 46 –  – 
Algorithm . Public key (bytes) . Secret key (bytes) . Signature (bytes) . Key/Cert. Gen. (ms) . 
Dilithium 2    25 
Dilithium 3    35 
Dilithium 4    33 
Picnic-L1 32 16 12 –32  41 
Picnic-L3 48 24 27 –74  – 
Picnic-L5 64 32 46 –  – 

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The two digital signature algorithms we benchmarked are Dilithium, which is lattice based algorithm and a finalist of round 3 of the NIST competition, and Picnic, which is hash based and an alternate of round 3 of the NIST competition. The difference in the mathematical foundation results in different overheads, as reflected in the benchmark table. Lattice based algorithms have: (i) larger key sizes, (ii) smaller signature size, and (iii) faster key/certificate generation speed. Similar trade-offs have been seen in benchmarks performed by Amazon for hybrid public key cryptography [31].

Depending on the resources of the IoT asset as well as the operational constraints, the organization will choose the best possible alternative. Many IoT assets may have limited storage. However, the key sizes for Dilithium are not significantly different from RSA (or Diffie–Hellman), which is usually at least  bit. Simultaneously, the signature for RSA is the same order of magnitude as the key. The signatures for Dilithium are also similar in size to their keys. Picnic, while having much lower key sizes, has a signature size that is at least one order of magnitude greater than RSA. Thus, if the asset currently uses RSA, Dilithium may be an appropriate replacement. Organizational roadmap will need to ensure that the asset can switch algorithms, e.g. through a software update. However, the organizational roadmap will not have to plan for hardware upgrades as the signatures sizes as well as the key sizes are similar to that used for RSA currently.


Lack of crypto agility is a risk that can hamper the ability of organizations to respond to changing regulatory and technology landscapes. At the same time, it is a difficult risk to address due the lack of prior incidents and data on exposure. This manifests in real life examples, which show that the transition can be both expensive and take a long time. For example, the SHA-1 to SHA-2 transition took over 10 years. Project Risk Analysis v1.0 by CORE crack serial keygen, a systematic review of threats that impinge on cryptography is needed to ensure that adequate agility is being built in as well as appropriate mitigation options are available for legacy and third-party systems.

CARAF proposed here is the first framework that allows enterprises to undertake such reviews and create an associated playbook. Applying this framework to the emerging threat of quantum computing to a generic IoT system provides clear actionable guidance for a risk mitigation strategy, in particular, identifying areas that need to be prioritized for protection and where it may be reasonable to accept the risk. Furthermore, converting this strategy into a tactical roadmap provides a better understanding of the solution space as well as the inherent challenges.

Conflict of interest statement. The authors of this papers are full time employees of Comcast Cable. The views expressed in this paper are those of the individual authors and do not reflect the official position of Comcast Cable.











et al.  Report on post-quantum cryptography. Technical report, National Institute of Standards & Technology,


Nist comments on cryptanalytic attacks on sha-1

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. Guidelines for cryptographic algorithm agility and selecting mandatory-to-implement algorithms, Project Risk Analysis v1.0 by CORE crack serial keygen.

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